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An American Enforcement
Model of Civil Process in a
Canadian Landscape

1. Introduction
One general perspective from which to view the Anglo-American
legal system shared by Canada is that proposed by Charles Darwin
to explain the origin and diversity of biologically distinct species.
Darwin's theory of evolution places emphasis upon the adjustment
or adaptation over time of biological characteristics to environmental factors by the selection of genetically determined features
enabling the most suited to their surroundings to better thrive - the
so-called "survival of the fittest".' Law might usefully be thought
of as bearing an analogous relationship to the social environment in
which it exists and must operate. As this milieu for various reasons
inevitably undergoes a process of change, a process dramatically
popularized as the "death of permanence" by Alvin Toffler 2 , so
must the legal system in response adapt itself to the needs dictated
by current conditions.3

*B.Sc., Ll.B., LI.M. (Harv.), Associate Professor, Dalhousie Law School
The author would like to thank Professor Lewis Sargentich of the Harvard Law
School for his kind advice in the preparation of this paper. Many of the ideas
presented herein, and much of the author's understanding of the American
materials, owe their origins to him and the course he teaches at Harvard in equitable
remedies. The reader should note that this paper largely speaks as of early 1978.
I. C. Darwin, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or, The
Preservation of FavouredRaces in the Struggle for Life (4th ed. London: John
Murray, 1866)
2. A. Toffler, FutureShock (New York: Random House, 1970)
3. The themes of the inevitability of social change and the consequent necessity for
legal reforms stemming from the tension between the old ways (and the need for
certainty) and the new demands (and the need for flexibility) are recurring ones in
recent Canadian legal literature. See, e.g., J.-G. Castel, The Law and the Legal
Profession in the Twenty-First Century (1973), 51 Can. B. Rev. I and 51 Can. B.
Rev. generally; J. Beetz, Reflections on Continuity and Change in Law Reform
(1972), 22 U. Toronto L. J. 129; R. A. Samek, A Case for Social Law Reform
(1977), 55 Can. B. Rev. 409; R. A. Samek, Beyond the Stable State of Law (1976),
8 Ottawa L. Rev. 549; L. R. Friedman, Law and Social Change in an Urban
Environment (1970), 8 Osgoode Hall L. J. 347; E. D. McWhinney, Social
Revolution and Constitutional Revolution in Canada: Some Reflections on the
Philosophy of Legal Change (1966-67), 12 McGill L. J. 479; D. R. Mandelkar,
The Role ofLaw in Social Change (1970), 8 Osgoode Hall L. J. 355
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Part of the environment in which Canadian processes must
operate is the reality of Canada's proximity to, and ties with, the
United States. Inevitably, economic, political, cultural, and indeed,
all social developments in that country influence similar developments in this country. As features of American society are, for
better or worse, adopted in this country, so features of the American
legal system arising from frictions in that society bear watching.
The rational Canadian lawyer turns increasingly to relevant
American precedent for support, 4 the rational legislator examines
American statutory schemes for solutions to society's problems and
likewise the rational student of civil process must pay heed to
American developments. The greater complexity of American
society tends to mean that many kinds of problems are encountered
there, and solutions adopted, before a similar problem arises here.
This time-gap offers Canadians the opportunity to evaluate the
American responses. 5
The purpose of this article is to introduce to the Canadian reader,
and apply in the Canadian context, an American development
currently receiving the attention of academic lawyers in that
country. In response to social needs, modern legislatures in the
United States have enacted statutes which provide broad, public
norms of conduct, whose violation results in a wrong being visited
upon large segments of the public. The courts in dealing with such
wrongs have, it has been suggested, acted so as to point to a
newly-evolved purpose for civil process. This purpose shifts
emphasis away from the traditional notion of civil process as
4. See J. M. Maclntyre,The Use ofAmerican Cases in CanadianCourts (1966), 2
U.B.C.L. Rev. 478. It is no longer uncommon for Canadian courts at all levels to
consider American cases. See, e.g., Thorson v. A.-G. Can., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138,
43 D. L. R. (3d) 1;Haig v. Bamford etal., [1977] 1 S. C. R. 466;Morgentalerv.
The Queen, [19761 1 S.C.R. 616; Seafarer'sInternationalUnion of Canadaet al.
v. Baltic Shipping Co. et al. (1975), 61 D.L.R. (3d) 530 (Fed. Ct.); Stein v. City of
Winnipeg (1974), 48 D. L. R. (3d) 223 (Man. C. A.); Farnhamet al. v. Fingoldel
al., [1973] 20. R. 132 (C. A.);Sulyoketal. v. Carrolletal. (1977), 73 D. L. R.
(3d) 417 (N.S.S.C.); Stubbe et al. v. P. F. Collier& Sons Ltd (1977), 74 D. L. R.
(3d) 605 (B. C. S. C.); R v. Maclean (1974), 27 C. R. N. S. 31 (N.S. Co. Ct.)
Even Green v. CharterhouseGroup CanadaLtd. etal. (1973), 35 D.L.R. (3d) 161
(Ont. H. Ct.), which rejects the application of Amercan law, considers its
application in the first instance (at 215-17) and appears to take support from it in
calculating the damages the plaintiff would have been entitled to if he had been
successful (at 239-40).
5. As J. M, MacIntyre, id. at 490, euphemistically stated: "When we have
available the distilled experience of able lawyers and judges, we should at least
look at it."
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providing private redress for an aggrieved plaintiff, into a model
utilizing civil process to enforce the public norms of conduct. This
new view will be referred to herein as the "Enforcement" model,
and will be contrasted with the traditional orientation, which will
usually be called the "Dispute Settlement" model or view. 6 The
Enforcement view grows from an attempt to explain phenomena
reflected in recent American cases. 7 These pheiomena deviate
sharply at times from the formal notions of the purpose of civil
procedures. An Enforcement model not only serves a positive
purpose by capturing in a descriptive way what has transpired, but
also acts as a normative tool in suggesting an orientation which has
implications for the content of rules in various doctrinal areas. This
article will attempt to show that Canadian developments contain the
seeds of the Enforcement model s and to illustrate, largely through
American examples, some of the implications of its further
flowering. It must be confessed at the outset, however, that
Canadian Enforcement phenomena are meagre. I will address in an
abbreviated fashion the possible reasons for this paucity.
The structure of this article will revolve around specific doctrinal
areas, preceded by a composite description of the two contrasting
models. The Dispute Settlement versus Enforcement debate largely
plays itself out in three broad, interrelated areas, namely, over the
ramifications of class actions, the use of complex injunctive relief
6. This terminology was originated by Professor Lewis Sargentich of Harvard. I

will generally use the word "Enforcement" herein when making reference to this
model, but will sometimes refer to the "Dispute Settlement" model or view as the

"traditional" or "formal" one.
7. In terms of jurisprudential orientation, the models contrasted herein might best
be thought of as a product of the "realist" movement. A realist may be thought of
as "one who, no matter what his ideological or philosophical views, believes that it
is important regularly to focus attention on the law in action at any given time and
to try to decide ...what is seen." Cited by J. U. Lewis, American Realism Versus
the Royal Tennis Tradition in Jurisprudence(1974), 22 Chitty's L. J. 225 at 226
from W. Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicloson, 1973) at 435, note 14

8.To examine all Canadian cases found in all the report series, even over a limited
time period, in order to ascertain the state of Canadian Enforcement phenomena
would be unrealistic. Instead, upon the assumptions that such phenomena, if
present, will be reflected in recent decisions and that the Dominion Law Reports
contain representative cases showing Canadian judicial activity, I used as an
empirical base for this paper the Third Series of the Dominion Law Reports (D. L.
R. (3d)), which begin in 1969 and at the time of research was into its 79th volume
(early 1978). Additionally, subject indexes and other standard reference tools were
used in relation to the specific topics discussed herein.
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and the extent to which intervention by third parties will be
permitted. I will touch upon the Enforcement lines drawn in the
United States in these areas, and reflect upon the state of Canadian
phenomena. Special emphasis will be placed upon class actions,
which should prove timely in light of the recent First Stage
amendments to the Combines Investigation Act 9 , which included a
spedfic, promisi n for piriat damage actaons, and in light of
Parliament's present debate over Bill C-13, the government's
Second Stage amendments, which propose to provide a special class
action rule upon a rationale which is, in part, explicitly
Enforcement. Finally, by way of conclusion, I suggest some
reasons for the comparative modesty of Canadian Enforcement
phenomena.

II. The ContrastingModels
American academic lawyers have recognized that litigation which
snaps the bounds of traditional notions of civil adjudication is
current phenomena in their courts1 o . Such cases are usually
complex, but they represent something more fundamentally radical
than a multiplication of issues, witnesses, documents, length and
even parties. They are cases which cannot be explained in terms of a
9. Stats. Can. 1974-75-76, c. 76, s. 12 [amending R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23 and
reating new s. 31.1].
10. The seminal piece recognizing the new use of civil process is A. Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation(1976), 89 Harv. L. Rev. 128 1, where
he contrasts "The Received Tradition" with "The Public Law Litigation Model".
The latter he indicates to bear the following attributes: the scope of the law suit is
shaped primarily by the court and the parties; the fact inquiry is predictive and
legislative; relief is forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on flexible and broadly
remedial lines, often having important consequences for many persons including
absentees; the remedy is negotiated; the administration of the decree requires the
continuing participation of the court; the judge is active, with responsibility not
only for credible fact evaluation but for organizing and shaping the litigation to
ensure a just and viable outcome; the subject matter of the law suit is a grievance
about the operation of public policy. Also of significance is an earlier article
contrasting "The Conflict Resolution Model" with "The Behaviour Modification
Model": K. E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process (1975), 27 Stan. L. Rev.
937. The Behaviour Modification model focuses upon the defendant, rather than
the plaintiff, and sees civil process as a means of altering behaviour by imposing
upon the defendant the costs of his activity with a view to the effect of this
imposition upon future conduct. See also, e.g. S. H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too
Much of Our Courts (1976), 70 F. R. D. 96 at 101 where he contrasts the court's
traditional function as "Dispute-resolvers" with his perception of its new role as
"Problem-solvers". Similar observations are found in relation to constitutional
adjudication. See A. Cox, infra, note 128
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Dispute-Settling purpose for civil process. They are cases often of
wide social impact and cast the court into a new judicial role. While
illustrations provided in later sections of this article make concrete
the concepts proposed, it is useful to bear in mind from the outset a
composite picture of each model.
The term "Dispute Settlement" is used to describe the
tradition-al, formal notions survounding civiil ad3udication. Chiaracteristically, this model focuses upon the plaintiff and his complaint
or grievance. His standing is seen as based upon his private stake
and personal interest in the outcome. The central vision is of a civil
lawsuit as a means of resolving or settling a private, personal
dispute between private parties. The lawsuit tends to be bi-polar
with the plaintiff and defendant's interests diametrically opposed.
These parties assume the burden of introducing evidence and are
seen as generally entitled to control the joinder of other parties and
the scope of inquiry. The court waits for plaintiffs who are
concerened enough to bring their disputes to it, and then acts only to
the extent called upon by the parties. The judge watches, as a
passive, neutral arbiter, an historical inquiry conducted by the
parties into a fairly specific, self-contained, past event.'
Intermeddlers are frowned upon. Relief tends to be on a
"winner-takes-all" basis. If granted, it will be narrow and specific,
logically derived from the nature of the right breached and showing
a decided preference for monetary compensation. The court will
avoid unnecessary intrusiveness or entanglement into the
defendant's affairs, and the parties are expected to rearrange their
affairs in accordance with the court's decision without further court
supervision or involvement. Absentees from the lawsuit are not
bound; one must have his day in court before being formally
affected by the suit. Concerns about ensuring compliance by the
defendant with norms of legal conduct are seen as the province of
11. The currency of this model of judicial behaviour in Canadian jurisprudence is
exemplified by Phillips et al. v. FordMotor Co. of CanadaLtd. et al. (1971), 18
D. L. R. (3d) 641 (Ont. C. A.) at 661-63 where Evans, J. A. for the majority sets
out the traditional role of a judge under the adversary system and strongly criticizes
the trial judge for acting as a "research director". Apparently the trial judge,
concluding that a brake failure was the cause of the automobile accident but that the
plaintiffs' theory of the cause of the failure was not adequate, conducted his own
inquiry into the brake failure. For a comment on this case and the issue generally,
see H. W. Silverman, The Trial Judge: Pilot, Participant,or Umpire? (1973), 11
Alta. L. Rev. 40. See also J. de N. Kennedy, Burdens of a Judge (1964-65), 13
Chitty's L. J. 252
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criminal and administrative law, perhaps of government initiated
civil suits, but certainly not of the citizen initiated law suit.
In contrast, the Enforcement model is characterized by an
emphasis upon the defendant's wrongful conduct and a concern that
this conduct conform to legal norms. The norms involved in these
kinds of suits tend to be set by statute as part of a broad legislative
scheme exuacted for the benefit of a larg. segmenxt of the public,
typically in such areas as civil and human fights, consumer and
environmental protection and competition laws. Their violation thus
usually affects a group of people and the legal action is based upon a
collective wrong. The breach tends to be in the form of a complex,
systematic policy or practice upon the part of the defendant, which
is usually a corporate entity. The lawsuit largely deals with the
operation of such statutorily declared public policy. Because of the
group nature of the wrong, concern is had for more than just the
plaintiffs particular position. Often an object of the lawsuit is to
return to the defendant the costs of his wrongful conduct, the small
claim class action being a prime mechanism. While the
Enforcement model does not negate the valuable distributive effects
of compensation reaching the plaintiff, it would not halt the civil
process when difficulties are encountered with achieving the
compensatory objective. Since emphasis is placed upon bringing the
defendant into compliance with the norms of proper conduct,
including correcting the effects of past wrongs and preventing future
repetition, specific affirmative relief is often necessitated. This
relief tends to take the form of a complex injunction which reorders
and restructures the defendant's conduct. Such an order is intrusive
and often requires a preceding deep inquiry into the defendant's
conduct and affairs. The indeterminant nature of this inquiry,
together with the greater interest of the public in the outcome, often
dictate that the Court not rely soley upon the parties' evidence but
exhibit some interference in the adversarial contest to ensure
sufficient facts come forward. A greater concern for the accuracy of
the fact-finding process is evident. The fact that the wrong
addressed and the relief granted are broad, and that many persons
are affected by the decree, means the court has a heightened concern
for absentees. This manifests itself in a liberal attitude toward
intervention, and less control by the original parties over party
stuctie aid management of the. lawsuit. Multiparty lawsuits result
in which an array of interests are represented, such that the process
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tends toward the legislative model of decision making 2 . The partly
prospective nature of the relief adds a predictive, future-oriented
aspect to the fact-finding inquiry and means that once the decree is
made, the Court will likely play a greater role in supervising and
overseeing its operation. The breadth of the inter-related facts
scrutinized by the court allows the detailed provisions of the decree
to be fashioned in many legally satisfactory ways. Hence negotiated
orders are likely, with the court participating together with parties in
the negotiations. Perhaps the implicit premise upon which the
Enforcement model is built is that, while the plaintiff may be
harmed by the defendent's wrongful violation of norms of public
conduct, the real damage is done to the public interest. And the
judicial process, above all else, must protect the public interest' 3 .
By way of caveat, it should be emphasized that the models
discussed herein are, like all models, conceptual. In attempting to
capture all of a complex world, they no doubt fall short of the target.
For example, most modem rules of civil procedure mark a departure
fyom the old formalism t a furnctional -view of pyozedye.
Functionalism fails, however, to explain the central features of
Enforcement. Also, being new and being based upon underlying
phenomena not yet fully developed, the Enforcement model itself is
not fully articulated. The contents of the model must still be
regarded as open-ended, amorphous, and somewhat tentative.
Further, it should not be thought that the debate between the two
models is very explicit in judicial decisions, nor that all cases which
can be best explained in Enforcement terms exhibit all Enforcement
attributes. The model is described in a general fashion and
gradations may exist in particular cases from a weak Enforcement
rationale to one approaching its full flowering. It should also be
emphasized that while the models are contrasting and often
competing, they are by no means mutually exclusive. Enforcement
does not extirpate a Dispute-Settling function. Traditional, private
12. This feature of Enforcement cases harkens back to the "many centered" or
"polycentric" tasks which Lon Fuller felt unsuited to adjudication: Collective
Bargainingand the Arbitrator, [1963] Wis. L. Rev. 32; The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication (1978), 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, at 394-404.
13. This hints at the invasion by civil process into the realm of criminal law and
suggests, as a basis for criticism of the Enforcement model, the fact that the model
sanctions the infliction of serious consequences upon the defendant without the
safeguards central to the criminal process. One response to this criticism, albeit not
dispositive of the issue, is that even traditional civil lawsuits may visit serious
consequences upon a defendant without such safeguards.
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lawsuits will continue to occupy much of a court's time, and such
litigation does at times have an Enforcement effect. Similarly,
adoption of an Enforcement view does not preclude the application
of aspects of the Dispute Settlement model. Indeed, Dispute
Settlement is largely subsumed by Enforcement. For example, in
the context of a claim for damages, the Enforcement view
emphasizes returning to the defendant the full measure of the loss
inflicted by him upon others. There is no reason, though, to jettison
the Dispute Settlement's compensatory objective if this can be
accomplished. Despite such shortcomings, however, the perspective the models bring to understanding the world makes the contrast
worthwhile.
Resting close to the heart of the reason for the rise of
Enforcement phenomena is, as I have indicated, the increasing
tendency for legislatures to enact broad schemes for the benefit of
large groups, if not of society as a whole. Hence, it is important to
recognize that, neglecting constitutional litigation, which is not
nearly of so great an import in Canada as in the United States, the
Enforcement view emphasizes the implementation of this legislative
policy. Because the statutory enactments are general and uncertain
in their application, because legislative policies sometimes conflict,
and because the breadth of the wrong addressed forces decisions
which have public and political impacts, a creative judicial role is
essential. But the underlying basis for the court's action should be
thought of as firmly rooted in policies adopted by the legislative
process. The norms being enforced are statutorily created by the
political process; for the courts, they are exogenously given. Thus,
one should not view the Enforcement model as usurping the
supremacy of Parliament or as speaking to a preference for judicial
policy making as opposed to political poloicy making, albeit judges
must "legislate" to fill the interstices 14 . The legitimacy of this use
of the civil process might be seen as resting upon delegation from
the legislative branch, which is free to change the policies being
implemented or restrict the open-ended framework within which the
judicial branch operates 15 .

14. See, e.g., P. Weiler, Legal Values and JudicialDecision-Making (1970), 48
Can. B. Rev. 1; L. P. Pigeon, The Human Element in the JudicialProcess (1970),
8 Alta. L. Rev. 301; 0. V. Gray, JudicialLegislation: Judicial Constructs and
Societal Facts (1973), 31 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 75
15. A. Chayes, supra, note 10at 1314
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I.

ClassActions
The principle on which the rule is based forbids its restriction to
cases for which an exact precedent can be found in the reports.
The principle is as applicable to new cases as to old, and ought to
be applied to the exigencies of modem life as occasion
requires. 16
A class action might usefully be thought of as a procedural device
originally intended to address the problem of numerosity. A number
of persons, usually plaintiffs but sometimes defendants 17 , too
numerous to practically join individually, are in a similar position
vis-a-vis the opposing party. The class device arose in the mists of
equity's distant past' 8 , and with the fusion of law and equity
became part of the rules of civil procedure administered by common
law courts. The rule, usually titled in Canada as a "representative
action", is deceptively simple. It typically 19 provides that where
16. Taff Vale Railway Co. v. AmalgatedSociety ofRailwayServants, [1901] A. C.
426 (H. L.) (PerLord Lindley at 442-43, in relation to class actions)
Y7. My discussion will deal only with plaintiff classes. Defendant classes are
authorized by the typical rule dealing with representative actions: see infra, note
19. For examples of defendant classes and some of the issues surrounding them see:
Heath Steele Mines Ltd. v. Kelly andAstle (1977), 16 N. B. R. (2d) 517 (S. C., Q.
B. D.) (difficulty over class composition and different defences); Mintuck v. Valley
River Band No. 63A et al. (1977), 75 D. L. R. (3d) 589 (Man. C. A.) (Indian band
required to defend by chief and council as representatives); PrinceAlbert Pulp Co.
Ltd v. Evanishen et al. (1975), 58 D. L. R. (3d) 8 (Sask. C. A.) (action for
injunction to prevent picketing by company against two individuals representing all
union members); interprovincialSteel andPipe Corp. Ltd. v. Shaw et al., [1975] 1
W. R. R. 659 (Sask, Q. B.) (one person may represent members of trade union if
he "will fairly and honestly try the right"); NationalBolt and Nut Corp. et al. v.
McDermottetal. (1974), 51 D. L. R. (3d) 191 (Ont. H. Ct., Div. Ct.) (officers of
union to defend as representing members); Research Corp. v. Pfister Assoc.
Growers Inc. (1969), 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill.) (unwillingness of defendant to
represent class); U.S.. v. American Optical Co. (1951), 97 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. 1Il)
(greater necessity to notify members of defendant class to ensure fair and adequate
group representation); Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R. C. L. Electronics,Inc. (1971),
53 F. R. D. 531 (D. N. H.) (defendant class members out of jurisdiction). See
generally H. H. Elliott, ClassActions (1975), Lectures L. S. U. C. 41 at 49-53; D.
J. Sherbaniuk, Actions By and Against Trade Unions in Contractand Tort (1958),
12 U. Toronto L. J. 151 at 154-74.
18. See J. A. Kazanjian, Class Actions in Canada(1973), 11 Osgoode Hall L. J.
397 at 399-413
19. For a typical rule, see Rule 75 of the Rules of Practice of Ontario, which
provides:
"Where there are numerous persons having the same interest, one or more may
sue o be sueda m~tay be -audnrized byi the voast tw dtenedi mi' hzi of, izr fow
the benefit of, all."
All provinces and the Federal Court of Canada (R. 1711) have a similar rule except
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"numerous persons" 2 0 have the "same interest" 2 1 (or a "common
interest", which has been interpreted to mean the same thing2 2),
one or more persons may sue for the benefit of all. Despite its
open-ended nature, the rule has received comparatively little use
and very little judicial gloss 23 . It appears that only within the
present decade has the Canadian legal profession become conscious
of the potential of this device. Indeed, so little attention has been
paid to it that a leading Canadian textbook on civil procedure,
published in 1970, now is in error in instructing Canadian lawyers,
as it does, that class actions are not available in respect of claims for
damages or for injunctions 2 4 . In contrast, the American federal
rule 25 , which is more detailed and restrictively specifies the
situations in which the class tool is to be used, has served as a
catalyst to an innovative and expansive use of this device, more of
Quebec which has enacted special legislation (See CCH Canadian Sales and Credit
Law Guide s. 15-680, p. 3181).
20. In Goodfellow v. Knight et al. (1977), 2 Alta. L.R. (2d) 17 (S.C.) doubt is
expressed that this requirement is met where one partner sues on behalf of himself
and two other partners.
21. See Shaw, infra, note 34 and accompanying text; Cobbold, infra, note 34 at
631 [D. L. R.] ("a class action is appropriate if it can be shown that success for the
plaintiff means success for the other members of the class, especially where the
same measure of success applies equally to all"); Drohan et al. v. Sangamo Co.
Ltd., [1972] 3 0. R. 399 (H. Ct.) (where at 402 "same interest" is defined "as
referring not to a relationship but solely to an interest in the result of the action...
[There] must be a common interest in the sense that all persons represented will
gain some relief though possibly in different proportions and perhaps in different
degrees"); Blackie etal. v. Postmaster-General(1975), 61 D. L. R. (3d) 566 (Fed.
Ct.) (since all members of union not letter carriers, relief sought not beneficial to all
members of letter carriers union and all members of class do not have a common
interest); McMillan et al. v. Yandell et al. (1971), 22 D. L. R. (3d) 398 (Ont. H.
Ct.) (dissent within class); Alden v. Gaglardi et al. (1970), 15 D. L. R. (3d) 380
(B.C.S.C.) (injunctive relief beneficial to all of class); Kroman's Electric Ltd. v.
Schultes et al. (1970), 11 D. L. R. (3d) 425 (Ont. H. Ct.) (mechanic's lien claimant
representing unsecured creditors); Shack v. Matthews Construction Co. Ltd.
(1962), 33 D. L. R. (2d) 97 (Ont. C. A.) (all shareholders must have an "identical
interest in the result of the action"); A. E. Osler & Co. v. Solman, [1926] 4 D. L.
R. 345 (Ont. C. A.), at 349.
22. Goodfellow, supra, note 20; Shaw, infra, note 34
23. A collection of Canadian cases dealing with class actions may be found in 1
Holmested and Gale on The Judicature Act of Ontario and Rules of Practice
(Annotated) (Toronto: The Carswell Co. Ltd., 1968) 706-23 and Cum. Suppl.
(1977) 175-78
24. W. B. Williston and R. J. Rolls, 1 The Law of Civil Procedure (Toronto:
Butterworth & Co. (Canada) Ltd., 1970), at 203
25. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23. See generally Advisory
Committee's Note, Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedurefor the
United States DistrictCourts (1966), 39 F. R. D. 73 at 98-107
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which will be said throughout this section. While the American rule
is not free from its problems, the experience with it makes apparent
the missing limbs of the Canadian rule, which have not been
judicially grafted into place despite the free role for creativity it
leaves open.
The purpose of a class rule is ostensibly to allow a group of
people to sue where it would be too cumbersome and impractical to
have each joined as a named party in the same suit. But why not
require each prospective plaintiff to sue himself in a separate suit?
Under a strict Dispute Settlement model such would be required.
Each plaintiff, it would be said, if he has sufficient personal
interest, ought to bring his own suit, over which he has control, for
the resolution of his private, individual grievance. Some emphasis
would also be placed upon the defendant's interest in personally
confronting someone who makes a claim against him. If an
individual plaintiff does not care enough to come forward with his
claim, the judicial process ought not to be concerned about him
either.
The American analysis (upon which the 1966 revision to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedures is based) would answer this
question functionally. A functionalist would advance three prime
reasons. First, from the standpoint of economy, it is likely an
inefficient use of resources to have each plaintiff finance his own
lawsuit and to have society absorb the cost of tying up scarce
judicial personnel and facilities to hear the same, or virtually the
same, evidence over and over again 2 6 . Secondly, piecemal
adjudication can have an unfair impact upon the defendant. He
might lose more as a result of separate suits than he would from a
single suit. For example, if one of many similarly situated plaintiffs
26. Canadian materials tend to consider only this economy rationale. See, e.g.
Naken etal. v. General Motors of Canadaetal. (1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 193 (Ont. H.
Ct.) (Div. Ct.) at 198 where Griffiths, J. describes the rule as one to avoid
"multiplicity of actions" or joining "all members of the class as party plaintiffs";
Ward. v. Benson (1902), 3 O.R. 199 (H. Ct.). See also H. H. Elliott, supra, note
17 at 41; J. A. Kazanjian, supra, note 18 at 413, 436; G. F. McFadyen, Consumer
Class Actions (1973), 2 Queen's L.J. 50 at 51. Some suggestion of a reason going
beyond convenience is made in N. J. Williams, infra, note 43 at 2: "The class
action procedure can ... also avoid the embarrassment that inconsistent findings
in separate proceedings could cause"; R. R. Reid, Commentary, Naken v. General
Motors of Canada Ltd.: A Stumbling-Block to CanadianConsumer Class Actions
(1978), 3 Can. Bus. L. 1. 78 at 79-80. For a more detailed discussion of economic
efficiency concerns, see K. W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation,
Deterrence, and Conflict ofInterest (1975), 4 J. Legal Studies 47 at 49-54.
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sues and the defendant wins, a second plaintiff could still sue the
same defendant since the previous suit does not bind absentees.
Even if the defendant wins again, the process could be carried out
ad nauseam until the class is exhausted, all the while placing the
defendant in jeopardy of an unfavourable verdict. If at any stage a
plaintiff should win, all other plantiffs who have not litigated their
claims might be able to rely upon this victory by way of estoppel to
take judgement against the defendant. The class action restores
mutality of estoppel - if the defendant succeeds against the class,
all the class members are bound. Similarly, if injunctive relief is
granted in each of several suits in a complex situation, inconsistent
obligations may be placed upon the defendant 27 . The third point is
significant. An atomic law suit could have an unfair impact upon
absentees who might have received some protection through being
class members in a class suit. While these absentees are not
formally bound, it might be that an outcome unfavourable to a
plaintiff in the initial unitary suit would, as a practical matter, be
disposifire of their interests. A cort, pailtulaly the same judge,
would be reluctant to decide an absentee's case, when brought upon
substantially similar evidence and raising the same issues, in a
different way than it decided the first. Or, it might happen that, in
the course of dealing with the first case, the court resolved an
uncertain question of law in relation to which the absentee, in his
case, would suffer a stare decisis fallout without having had the
opportunity to make representations.
Once a Dispute Settler has accepted economic efficiency as a
justification for permitting class suits, functional concerns flow
naturally since they are, after all, only a commitment to ensuring the
procedure operates efficiently and fairly. Is a class suit, however,
just a mechanism for achieving economy and avoiding unfairness by
bringing together into one proceeding a collection of individual
suits? Is it merely a massive joinder or consolidation or aggregation
technique? The experience with class suits, it is submitted, shows
that is does serve a further purpose and that there is a further reason
why we should not simply require each prospective plaintiff to bring
his own suit.
27. Note that this argument, unfairness to the defendant, while persuasive in
suggesting why there should be a class suit theoretically, seems to be undercut in
practice, where it is rare to see a defendant urging a plaintiff class suit on this basis.
Defendants usually oppose class maintenance and seem prepared to take the risk of
unitary adjudication.
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This additional purpose and reason is illuminated by considering
class damage claims. The stage for introducing the new orientation
is set by looking at a debate which arises in Canadian cases as to the
extent to which damages are available to a plaintiff class. This issue
has been a preoccupation of our courts. As earlier discussion would
predict, a Dispute Settlement orientation would see the question of
damages as a private, personal matter between the injured party and
the defendant. It is seen as an individual question and the
prospective plaintiff, it is said, ought to bring his grievance directly
to the court himself, where the defendant will have the opportunity
to meet this claimant and ensure the validity of this particular
person's claim. This strict view of damages as, a priori, too
individual a question for class treatment stems from the still
influential anaysis of Fletcher Moulton, L. J.in Markt & Co. Ltd.
v. Knight Steamship Co., Ltd., who simply stated that ". . . [N]o
representative action can lie where the sole relief sought is damages,
because they have to be proved separately in the case of each
plaintiff . . . .' ,, Even in recent years some have uncritically
29
accepted this statement.
On the other hand, very recent cases have espoused the view that
the mere fact the class action sounds in damages is not fatal. Instead
the court must ask itself "whether the damages are to be assessed
personally for each person sought to be represented or are in the
nature of general damages for the class as a whole"30; the former is
not permitted while the latter is the proper subject of a class suit.3
While lip-service continues to be paid to this distinction, its
artificiality has led courts to seek ways to circumvent it. The least
28. [191012K. B. 1021 at 1040-41
29. See, e.g. supra, note 24; H. H. Eliott, supra, note 17; Drohan, supra., note
21 at 402; Wallace v. FraserCompanies et al. (1973), 8 N.B.R. (2d) 455 (S.C.,
Q.B.D.) at 464
30. Goodfellow, supra, note 20 at 22
31. Thus, in Northdown Drywall & ConstructionLtd. and Simone v. Austin Co.
Ltd. et al. (1975), 59 D.L.R. (3d) 55 (Ont. H. Ct. Div. Ct.) where a class action
was brought on behalf of all union local members alleging a loss of the benefit of
employment, it was held that a claim for lost wages was improper, since the sum
claimed was an accumulation of personal claims, but that a claim to check-offs for
ordinary union purposes and for pension, welfare and supplemental unemployment
benefits was proper. The latter was a claim for damages done to the class as a class.
See also Murphy v. Webbwood Mobile Home Estates Ltd. (1978), 19 O.R. (2d)
300 (H. Ct.) where separate contracts between tenants and their landlord prevented
the maintenance of a class claim to recover excess amounts paid to the landlord for
water charges and taxes.
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distortion is caused by the so-called "fund" test, which looks to see
if the amount of the defendants' wrongful gain can be neatly
calculated to form a "fund" which can then be distributed pro
32
rata.
The logical extension of this reasoning is to uphold the class
action where the "fund" can be calculated through the defendant,
but distribution requires the calculation of entitlement to each class
member to be done individually. 3 3 More will be said, infra, about
this notion of collectively calculating damages for later distribution.
The next step in the Canadian progression is to allow the class
of a fund is only
action to proceed where a collective calculation
34
claims.
individual
aggregating
possible through
32. InNaken, supra, note 26 at 198 Griffiths, J. spoke of a "fund" in which all
members of the class have a common interest and called the existence of the fund a
"notional concept". He did not feel, however that a claim for $1,000 on behalf of
all owners of 1971-1972 Firenza motor vehicles met the test, largely because the
$1,000 claims were "losses personal to each purchaser". Farnham v. Fingold,
[19-3) 20.R, 132,33 D.L.R. (3d) 156 (C.A.), though, wcald seemingty meet the
test. There a chambers motion to strike out the statement of claim was dismissed.
The case involved a claim by minority shareholders for damages from a controlling
group on the grounds that the members of the controlling group had made an
improper profit on the sale of their shares. The class action was allowed to proceed.
What was sought by the plaintiffs was the gross aniount of premium over market
price received by the controlling shareholders, with this amount to be distributed
pro rata and the Appeal Court left it to the trial judge to decide if this claim was
proper.
33. In a class action on behalf of hotel employees Shabinsky v. Horwitz et al.
(1971), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 318 (Ont. H. Ct.), the court made a declaration that certain
service charges which had been added by a hotel to customers' bills, and kept by it,
were held in trust for the plaintiff class, and ordered the amount of the fund
(approximately $20,000) to be paid into court. Instead of a pro rata distribution,
however, the court directed the money to be distributed individually by the Master.
See also Westinghouse CanadaLtd. v. Buchar et al. (1975), 59 D.L.R. (3d) 641
(Ont. C.A.) where a class action was maintained on behalf of all creditors to create
a fund by setting aside a fraudulent conveyance, with the fund so created to be
divided as prescribed by Ontario's Creditors'ReliefAct.
34. This position is implicit in Cobbold et al. v. Time Canada Ltd. (1976), 1
C.P.C. 274, 71 D.L.R. (3d) 629 (Ont. H. Ct.) where a class action by the
subscribers to Time Magazine's Canadian edition was maintained against the
publisher when the Canadian edition was discontinued. The plaintiffs wanted either
to receive the American edition for a time period equal to the unexpired portion of
their Canadian subscriptions or damages based upon the price difference between
the two editions during the unexpired portion of the subscription terms. In refusing
to strike out the action, Stark, J. recognized that the contract of each class member
was identical with the other members, except for the subscription dates. And in
refusing to strike the damage claim, he must have been prepared to allow damages
to be calculated if necessary by summing each subscriber's individual claim,
although this might be done without individual proof from the defendant's records.
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What underlies the debate over damages is the question of the
extent to which class actions are proper where all the questions
involved are not common to the whole class. What has been hinted
at by the cases is that the strongest economy rationale is not
necessary to maintain a class suit - all the questions need not be
fully common to the class. The presence of individual questions
strikes at the heart of Dispute Settlement. These cases further faintly
hint that the justification for tolerating individual questions over the
objections posed by the Dispute Settlement model may not simply
be economy but rather a concern for deterring the defendant, a
concern for enforcing the norms of proper conduct violated by the
wrongdoer.
The Canadian cases underlying the preceding analysis do little
more than set the stage for Enforcement activities. A full
Enforcement view of a class damage action would not be concerned
about the personal aspects of damage claims but would rather focus
upon ensuring that the proper measure of damages inflicted by the
defendant's conduct are returned to him. It is the extraction from the
defendant rather than the compensation to the plaintiff which is
35
important. The object is deterrence.
Examining class suits from a deterrence orientation provides new
insights into some current problems with respect to their use, and
serves to provide a coherence to phenomena which depart from
traditional norms. Thus, upholding class suits involving individual
questions helps to promote deterrence. One important feature of a
The same kind of position is explicitly the essence of Shaw et al. v. Real Estate
Board of GreaterVancouver (1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 250 (B.C.C.A.) which must
be regarded as the bighwater mark for Canadian class damage actions. Involved
was a claim by a class of listing salesmen for the return of a part of their real estate
commissions which had been illegally paid to the Board. Obviously each class
member will have paid different amounts to the Board and the amount to be paid
back by the Board can only be determined by accumulating each salesman's
individual claim. The illegality of the defendant's conduct appears to motivate the
court (at 254-55).
35. One of the more explicit judicial endorsements of this objective is found in
Dolgow v.Anderson (1968), 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y.) at 487 where District
Judge Weinstein stated:
"The Rule 23 class action has much the same prophylactic function in the field
of securities regulation that the shareholder derivative suit has in the area of
general corporate law. In addition to seeking to compensate those directly
injured, the federal securities laws are designed to deter corporate Qfftcia and
insiders from engaging in the kind of machinations alleged to have taken place
here . . . By making real the threat of exposure and civil liability, the class
action also serves to effectuate this objective."
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class suit is that it allows class members to remain passive. The
more that is required from passive members, the less likely it is that
they will act. Under Dispute Settlement's compensatory objective
we would see little reason to be worried about compensating
someone who was not even concerned enough himself to seek
redress. However, if our objective is to make the wrongdoer pay the
external costs his illegal activity imposes, then we would want
payment to be extracted for the passive as well as active class
member. The more common questions that can be resolved, the
more likely a class member with a passive disposition will act when
something is unavoidably required of him.
The preference for maintaining class member passivity is
reflected in the way some courts have handled problems which have
confronted them. The collective calculation of damages is one
example. Customarily damages are calculated by individual
assessments with the plaintiff assuming the burden of proving his
claim. Where there are several claimants, the individual damage
awards are summed together and the defendant must pay this total to
the plaintiffs. However, damages for the class can be calculated in a
collective fashion in many instances without regard to indivudal
entitlements. In the case of an overcharge by a stockbroker as in the
famous Eisen3 6 litigation, a formalist would see it as essential that
each of the many thousands of individuals trading shares come to
court to confront the defendant and prove at least the amount of his
loss. They would argue that only through summing the results of
these individual proofs could the court determine the amount of
damages that the defendant would have to pay. Tyler, J., on the
other hand, avoided this unmanageable procedure by proposing to
37
calculate the gross award from business and official records.
Perhaps some of the earlier mentioned Canadian cases were groping
38
towards this result.
While it might be argued that this collective calculation injects an
36. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin et al. (1971), 52 F. R. D. 253 (S. D. N. Y.);
reversed (1973), 479 F. 2d 1005 (2nd Cir.)
37. Id. at 261-62: "In approaching this question [computation of damages], it is
recognized that an exact computation is not required; it is sufficient, of course, if
there is relevant data from which the jury can make a just and reasonable estimate
of the damage ... In this case, I am satisfied that gross damages may be fairly
estimated without having individual claims filed by each class member. The
sources for such a computation will include at least the following: defendants own
records, [certain other records not emanating from the plaintiffs]. ..
38. See supra, notes 32-33
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element of approximation into the results, a Dispute Settler could
not object too strenuously if the system was reasonably accurate
since its real effect is simply to minimize transaction costs, a fairly
traditional goal of civil procedure. A more fundamental objection is
that collective calculation increases the gross award over what
would have been the case through individual assesments since some
class membeys -would not ha e come forward. It may not be possible
or practical to identify or locate some members to give them notice.
Of those who received notice, some would remain passive because
of lack of understanding or a lack of interest. If the defendant is to
pay more than he would under procedures based on a compensatory
objective, something more than Dispute Settlement notions are
required to justify this collective calculation of gross damages.
This analysis carries forward into a more controversial area,
namely the distribution of the gross damages once calculated. In an
easy case, such as one would expect Cobbold3 9 to be, the defendant
could have complete computerized records, such as subscription
information, and it would be a relatively simple matter to have the
defendant from this information make up cheques and mail them to
class members, whose passivity could be preserved to the end. In
other cases, it may be possible to avoid requiring much initiative
from class members by setting up informal, flexible methods for the
submission of claims, such as to a claims committee rather than to
the court, and using simple affidavits or signed statements. In all
likelihood, however, after these procedures are exhausted, there
will remain, for various reasons, an undistributed surplus from the
collective estimate of gross damages. While any overhead for the
suit not already collected from the defendant could be further
deducted, what happens to any remainder-still left?
A traditionalist would emphasize the idea that the defendant is
only obligated to pay those who prove their claim, and hence this
surplus ought to go back to the defendant. The Enforcer would
emphatically reject this solution since it would leave the defendant
with part of the fruits of his wrong. No Canadian court seems to
have grappled with this problem, but some American courts have.
While the votes are not all in, schemes have been used to distribute
the surplus in a manner which benefits a group approximating the
plaintiff class. 40 This is usually referred to as non-congruent or
39. Supra, note 34
40. See, e.g. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967), 63 Cal. Reptr. 724, 433 P. 2d 732
(S.C.) (State as amicus curiae argues, but court does not decide, that unclaimed
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"fluid" recovery since some people benefit who are not part of the
class and so would have had no claim against the defendant.
Sometimes the money is simply escheated to the state to benefit all
citizens. How can distribution of part of the award to people without
a claim against the defendant be jusitifed under a Dispute Settlement
model of civil process?
Thus far I have been discussing class damage actions without any
overt distinction between small and large claims. Consider for a
moment a situation like Cobbold41 , perhaps the only true Canadian
small claim example. There the amount of the alternative damage
claim was the difference in the annual subscription rates of the
American and the Canadian editions of Time Magazine. Since these
rates were $30 and $18 respectively, most class members would
have a stake in the suit in the neighbourhood of $12. Obviously, if
the suit had been struck out as a class action, not many subscribers
would have sued individually. A single individual suit might have
been treated by the Canadian publisher as a "test case", but it could
just as easily have refused to do so. Under a Dispute Settlement
model, reliance is placed upon an individual plaintiff having a
sufficient stake in a claim that he will actively seek judicial
resolution. Indeed, it disciplines lawyers who "chase ambulances",
seeking to act as entrepreneurs and foment litigation where none
would have otherwise taken place. How, under a Dispute
Settlement Model, do we justify a procedure which would allow the
use of scarce judicial resources to deal with a suit where none would
42
have otherwise been brought?
remainder from gross amount of taxicab overcharges should go to it; this case was
settled with the settlement funds going to reduce taxi fares); Bebchik v. Public
Utilties Commission (1963), 318 F. 2d 187 (D. C. Cir. en banc) (overcharged by
public transit company ordered to be used for the benefit of all transit users since it
was not feasible to make refunds to all individuals overcharged); State of WVest
Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co. (1971), 440 F. 2d 1079 (2nd Cir.) (court approved
consent decree directing unclaimed funds to be paid to the state through its
Attorney-General). See also the Hart - Scott - Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of
1976, 90 Stat. 1383, which authorizes damages to be estimated in the aggregate
without proof of individual claims and to be distributed either as "the district court
in its discretion may authorize" or to "the State as general revenues" by way of a
deemed civil penalty; Note, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres
Remedy (1972), 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 448. See contra, Eisen, supra, note 36
(disapproving Tyler, J.'s scheme of "fluid recovery", which would have used
unclaimed residue to benefit all odd-lot traders by reducing the odd-lot charges; the
U.S.S.C. in upholding the Second Circuit at (1974), 94 S. Ct. 2140 made no
comment about the propriety of "fluid recovery").
41. Supra, note 34
42. This kind of effect upon traditional notions was recognized by M. J. Trebilock,
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The importance of an Enforcement rationale to Canadian class
damage actions is masked by the limited judicial developments to
date. Scholars are advocating consumer class actions, 43 law reform
bodies are studying new class action provisons 44 and Parliament is
considering a bill which uses the class device as an enforcement
tool. 45
Bill C-13 proposes to include a class action pyo'Asion diretly
within new amendments to the anti-combines legislation. This class
action provision is linked to the specific authorization, in the 1975
amendments to the Combines Investigation Act 46 of a private
damages remedy. Historically, competition policy in Canada has
been based upon a criminally oriented Act justified under
Parliament's criminal law power. 47 A shift to civil procedures
began as a result of the recommendations of a report prepared in
1969 by the Economic Council of Canada, 48 as the Government had
requested in 1966. When legislation flowing from the impetus of
this report was finally passed in 1975, it contained, as a new section
31.1 to the Act, a provision allowing for the recovery of damages4 9
PrivateLaw Remedies for MisleadingAdveristing (1972), 22 U. Toronto L. J. 1 at
27. See also T. J. Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View
(1969), 10 B.C. Ind. and Com. L. Rev. 515 at 525: "It provides a new device for
bringing before the court great numbers of passive litigants who would otherwise
have remained silent."
43. See, e.g., N. J. Williams, Consumer Class Actions in Canada - Some
Proposalsfor Reform (1975), 13 Osgoode Hall L.J. I (who explicitly incorporates
Enforcement rationale at 63); M. J. Trebilock, id.; G. F. McFadyen, supra, note 26.
44. According to personal communication from Professor Neil J. Williams, of the
Osgoode Hall Law School, the law reform commissions of both Ontario and British
Columbia, as well as the Ontario Civil Procedure Revision Committee are studying
class action reforms. As well, Quebec has enacted new legislation: see supra, note
19.
45. Since writing this section (1978), Parliament has been twice dissolved and Bill
C-13 has died on the Order Paper. However, the Honourable Andr6 Ouellet, the
present Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, has affirmed the Liberal
Governments intention to reintroduce the Bill.
46. Supra, note 9.
47. See generally B. C. McDonald, Constitutional Aspects of Canadian
Anti-Combines Law Enforcement (1969), 47 Can. B. Rev. 160, esp. at 172-88.
48. Interim Report on CompetitionPolicy (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), at 107
et seq ...
49. It should be noted that s. 55 in the initial proposal to Parliament, Bill C-256
introduced June 29, 1971, would have allowed double damages to be recovered
rather than actual damages as finally enacted. See W. T. Stanbury, Penalties and
Remedies Under the Combines Investigation Act 1889-1976 (1976), 14 Osgoode
Hall L. J. 571 at 603-06, 619-20 (who argues for double damages as well as class
actions to make the civil remedy effective).
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by a private party injured as a result of a violation of the Act or a
failure to comply with an order of the Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission or a court under the Act. 50 At the same time that this
provision was being channelled through Parliament as part of the
so-called "First Stage" amendments, a two-part study was being
conducted on the legal and economic aspects of using a class action
piovision in conjunefion -with the damages emedy .5' Bth authos,
from the standpoint of their respective disciplines, endorsed a class
action provision; both emphasized in their reasoning an Enforce52
ment rationale.
50. A problem appears to exist over whether the inclusion of a private civil cause
of action in this legislation is constitutional. The better view seems to be that it is
constitutionally permissible: see P. W. Hogg and W. Grover, The Constitutionality
of the Competition Bill (1976), 1 Can. Bus. L. J. 197; B. C. McDonald, supra,
note 47 esp. at 225-35; A. S. Brent, An Act to Amend the Combines Investigation
Act (1974-76), 40 Sask. L. Rev. 106 at 114-16; F. F. Henderson, Recent
Development in Competition Law; The Limits of the Federal CriminalLaw Power,
[1910. L.S.U.C. Lettuyes 109. See semple MacDonald V. Vapor Canada Ltd.
(1976), 22 C.P.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.), per Laskin, C.J. at 12-13; Comment (P. W.
Hogg) (1976), 54 Can. B. Rev. 361 at 363-65. See contra S.G.M. Grange, The
Constitutionality of Federal Intervention in the Marketplace - The Competition
Case (Montreal: C. D. Howe Research Institute, 1975) esp. at 35-38; C. J. M.
Flavell, Canadian Competiton Law: A Business Guide (Montreal: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, 1979) at 15-3 1.
51. N. J. Williams and J. Whybrow, A Proposal for Class Actions Under
Competiton Policy Leglislation (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976).
52. Professor Williams, presenting the legal persepctive, discusses the function of
a damages award in a section of his paper entiteld "Damages Award and
Enforcement of Competition Policy", and states as follows at p. 40:
"The remedy has a further sigificance as potentially it is an auxiliary means of
enforcing the combines legislation itself. In Canada so far this activity has been
the responsibility of government almost entirely [footnote omitted], with the
government investigating violations and prosecuting offenders in criminal
proceedings. Now the private civil damages plaintiff will participate in the
enforcement activity since a damages award for a substantial amount will have
the same deterrent value as a criminal find [sic]. A civil action that results in a
damages liability sufficient to deter offenders can thus substitute for a criminal
prosecution as a measure for securing the observance of the competition laws."
The deterrence-enforcement rationale appears elsewhere in his paper as well at pp.
47, 63. Jennifer Whybrow, presenting the economists' viewpoint, recognizes
deterrence as a goal of anti-combines enforcement and the role of the civil damages
- class action combination in acting as a deterrent by increasing the risk to firms of
"incurring substantial monetary penalties." [ at 237; also 208-09] Indeed, so
strong is the emphasis on using civil proceedings as an enforcement tool that the
report recommends a "substitute action" procedure, under which the Director of
Investigation and Research could sue the wrongdoer civilly to recover, and pay into
the public revenue, damages where the court has refused to allow a private suit
upon unmanageability grounds. [at 141-43]
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The Williams-Whybrow study was endorsed by the Department
53
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs in its Second State Proposals
and Bill C-42, incorporating the class and substitute actions
provisions as a new section 39.1 to the Combines InvestigationAct,
Corporate Affairs
was introduced by the Minister of Consumer 5and
4
1977.
16,
March
on
and received first reading
Bill C-13 was intiyd'ced to yeplace Bill C-42 by the inistr 4f
Consumer and Corporate Affairs Warren Allmand and received first
reading on November 18, 1977. 55 The Bill endorses an
53. Proposalsfora New CompetitionPolicyfor Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1977).
54. The House of Common's Standing Committee on Finance, Tade and
Economic Affairs examined the Bill, and made several recommendations, the
prime ones with respect to the Enforcement rationale being as follows:
I.Recommendation 87 would require the class representative to demonstrate
that "a representative cross-section of the class is interested in having the
action proceed". Requiring a kind of positive opting-in by a number of class
members, especially if this were to become a numbers game, would both
increase the representative plaintiff's initial expense and destroy the
passivity so very important to a class member's position. Such a requirement
would substantially undermine the utility of the class device in all but a small
number, large claim situation.
2. Following a curious piece of reasoning, the Committee in Recommendation
90 would require the administrative official, as a prerequisite to a substitute
action, to show that the amount of any judgment which he obtains "may
reasonably be expected to become available to some or all of the members of
the class." The Committee recognizes that if the substitute action were not
allowed where the individual's loss is small, the "wrongdoer would thus be
enabled to profit by his wrongdoing at the expense of the victim." Pursuit of
this logic, according to the Committee, means that the substitute action
provision is unsound in not accomplishing the objective of redress. It seems
the Committeew'mlid yefey to sve, the vncigdoey Pmofit if 'rees cannt be
achieved rather than have the funds go into the public revenue.
3. Recommendation 92 would limit the already enacted damage provison (s.
31.1) to the recovery of loss or damage which the wrong-doer "ought to
have realized was likely to result from such conflict or failure". It seems
strange in light of the Committee's aversion to placing an economic burden
upon the consumer to find it departing from the standard of actual loss or
damage.
55. Unfortunately from an Enforcement perspective, this Bill entirely deletes the
substitute action, "in the face of widespread criticism that such a provision would
permit the Advocate to attack under civil law what he could not prove under the
more stringent standards of criminal law, and that it represented in the eyes of the
business community, unfairness and serious over-reaching by the government."
(Backgrounder Documentation, An Overview of the Competition Bill (Ottawa:
Dept. of Consumers and Corporate Affairs, Nov. 1977) at 7)). On the positive side,
Bill C-13 does reject Recommendations 87 and 92 of the Common's Committee
above-mentioned. And it continues to see class actions "as a deterrent to reinforce
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Enforcement view in three ways. First, it proposes a new section
31.1 (1.1) which authorizes the Court in a private suit to grant, in
addition to damages, "any other remedy or relief applied for in the
proceedings, whether by way of injunction or otherwise, that the
court by reason of it general jurisdiction has authority to grant."
Secondly, the Bill maintains the opt-out rather than opt-in concept
for class members. And finally, proposed section 39.12 (4) provides
that the Court should not refuse to allow the action to be maintained
as a class action on the grounds that the relief claimed is damages,
that damages will have to be calculated on an individual basis for
each class member, or that the relief claimed arises out of separate
contracts or transactions with the defendant. Professor Williams'
explanatory note in his study indicates that this provision is intended
to leave the deterrent rather than compensatory objective intact and
to allow the court to make the defendant responsible for the full
amount of damages inflicted. 5 6
Turning now from the damage action, consider a second general
use for the class device whose ramifications are even more
neglected in Canada, namely, where injunctive relief is sought.
Injunctions are important to an Enforcement model since their effect
is to directly and specificially compel compliance with the norms of
proper conduct. Chastian5 7 is perhaps the only significant Canadian
case in this context. There the defendant Power Authority acted on a
ground common to all members of the class of residential customers
by requiring a security deposit before giving service to those
considered poor credit risks. A declaration and an injunction were
sought by the class, and the court, finding the practice
discriminatory, granted both. The class wide injunction restrained
the defendant from demanding, collecting, or keeping security
deposits in respect of all residential accounts. While the
representative plaintiffs suing just on their own behalf could have
obtained the declaration (which may have been, but was not
necessarily, sufficient),58 any injunctive relief which they obtained
complaince with competition legislation." (Backgrounder Documentation, Class
Actions (Ottawa: Dept. of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Nov. 1977) at 2.))
56. Supra, note 51 at 173-74
57. Chastain et al. v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (1973), 32
D.L.R. (3d) 443 (B.C.S.C.)
58. Depsite its lack of compulsion, declaratory relief is commonly sought by way
of class proceedings in Canada. See e.g. Cobbold, supra, note 34; Blackie, supra,
note 21; Stein v. City of Winnipeg, supra, note 4; A.-G.N.S. et al. v. Bedford
Service Commission (1976), 72 D. L. R. (3d) 639 (N. S. S. C., A. D.) rev'd [1977]
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would normally have been narrowly tailored to their particular
situation. Instead, potentially important economies were achieved
in this case by obtaining an injunction of class-wide effect. Note
that in a second kind of case, where the defendant is not acting
through a practice or policy upon a ground common to a group, an
individual suit may be sufficient to benefit all affected. For
example, a single person obtaining an injunction against a nightclub
extruding noise in excess of a municipal by-law necessarily benefits
his noise-hating neighbours as well.
More to the point from an Enforcement orientation is a third kind
of general situation involving injunctive relief. While there seem to
be no Canadian examples of this use for the class device, it has
arisen in the United States frequently in conjunction with
complaints about discrimination in employment on the basis of race.
The classic example follows the lines of Pettvay v. American Cast
Iron Pipe company. 19 There an attack was made on behalf of all the
defendant company's black workers against the firm's promotion
practices. A major part of the relief sought was to place class
members into their "rightful place" - i.e. the position they would
have been in but for the operation in the past of the discriminatory
practices. If individual suits had been brought by each employee
and a court sought to place each individual into his "rightful
place", the narrowness of the perspective brought to bear during
piecemeal litigation would have inevitably led to a conflict in the
judicially awarded positions because of a failure to interrelate
individual entitlements. Moreoever, a more likely outcome is that
individuals would not have through their atomic suits achieved their
"rightful place". This is so because the real judicial task was not to
decree specific jobs but rather to restructure the promotion and job
transfer practices to ease the entrance of blacks into their "rightful
places". Only through the breadth of perspective possible in a class
suit could the task be effectively undertaken. The class device
2 S. C. R. 269; Nova Scotia Boardof Censors v. McNeil (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d)
35, 5 N. R. 43, 55 D. L. R. (3d) 632 (S. C. C. ); Thorson v. A.-G. Can., supra,
note 4;McMilan, supra, note 21;Alden, supra, note 21.
3ee generally A. Findlay, DeclaratoryJudgement (1961), Lectures L. S. U. C.
183; D. Mullan, The DeclaratoryJudgement: Its Place as an Administrative Law
remedy in Nova Scotia (1975), 2 Dal. L. J. 91; D. T. Warren, The Declaratory
Fudgement:Reviewing AdministrativeAction (1966), 44 Can. B. Rev. 610. At least
)ne case has used the class device in connection with applications for certiorariand
3rohibition: Easton v. City of Winnipeg (1976), 69 D. L. R. (3d) 585 (Man. C. A.).
59. (1974), 494 F. 2d 211 (5th Cir.).
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fosters a holistic overview by the Court. Mere economy is not the
justification; it is simply that more can be accomplished in a
class-wide suit than in piecemeal litigation. Complex practices can
be better altered to conform with statutory norms, and legislative
policies can be better enforced, through class actions.
Complex Injunctions
Injunctive relief of a complex, sophisticated, intrusive nature is a
current American phenomenon. Affirmative equitable relief is
granted as the circumstances warrant to bring the defendant into
compliance with statutory norms, to ensure future conduct conforms
with the norms by reordering and restructuring the defendant's
practices, and to correct the effect of past wrongful conduct. As we
have seen, such relief is often coupled with class actions, but this is
not always so. To understand the breadth of this relief and to sense
the nature of the phenomenon, consider several American examples
from disparate fields.
Cases such as Pettway60 involving discrimination upon the basis
of race in the employment context provide one illustration. 61 There,
the court, in the course of vindicating statutory rights created by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,62 did not cease its inquiry
after finding discrimination on the basis of the way in which black
workers were initially assigned to the less preferred departments
within the plant. It continued in its inquiry to examine the
promotion system in effect. While this system was upon its face
racially neutral in recognizing seniority upon a departmental basis,
it was discriminatory in impact because it locked in the effects of the
past discrimination. Thus, if a black worker wished to transfer out
of his department to one where the working conditions were better
and the upper wage levels were potentially higher, he would have to
begin in the lowest position in the new department at the starting
wage rate in effect there. This might be a lower rate than he was
60. Id.
61. See also U.S. v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries (1975), 517 F. 2d 826 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied (1976), 96 S. Ct. 1684; U.S. et al. v. United States Steel
Corporationet al. (1973), 5 E. P. D. at para. 8619 (N. D. Ala.); Bush et al. v.
Lone Star Steel Co. et al. (1974), 7 E. P. D. at para. 9179 (E. D. Texas); U.S. v.
GeorgiaPower co. (1973), 474 F. 2d 906 (5th Cir.); Louisiana v. GeorgiaPower
Co. (1973), 474 F. 2d 906 (5th Cir.); U.S. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1971), 446 F.
2d 652 (2nd Cir.); Louisiana v. U.S. (1965), 380 U.S. 145; Note, Title VII,
SeniorityDiscriminationandthe Incumbent Negro (1967), 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1260
62. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
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receiving in the predominantly black department. And since
seniority was on a departmental basis, he would lose whatever
seniority he had built up. Even if the seniority system were
immediately changed to a plant-wide basis, thus bringing the
company into cornplaince and ensuring that future promotions
would be on a non-discriminatory basis, it might still leave some
workers locked into a job because of the past discrimination. Hence,
courts evolved and applied a "rightful place" theory in order to
assist black workers to attain the position they would have occupied
but for the past discrimination practiced against them. The court, in
directing wide-ranging injunctive relief, ordered, for example,
"advance entry", by which blacks were enabled to by-pass entry
level jobs in other departments, and "red circling", under which
blacks were able to maintain their old wage rate when they
transferred to a lower paying job in another department, until they
advanced to a job paying their old wage rate. It is easy to see the
extent to which such relief goes beyond a simple prohibition of
discrimination and represents a considerable intrusion into the
defendant's business operation.
As a second example, consider the school desegregation cases. 63
In these cases school districts are effectively placed into a kind of
judicial receivership. 64 The courts are not content either to simply
prohibit further racial discrimination or to leave with the appropriate
school district officials the discretion to choose what measures will
be taken to bring about compliance. Rather, the courts step in to
restructure the school system itself, directing such controversial
steps as busing children to distant schools to provide a racial mix. 65
Not only is judicial intrusion in the school district's affairs extreme
but the court must involve itself greatly in the supervision of its
Drders in a situation like this.
Thirdly, a case like Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso
53. See, e.g. a case study of the first five years of litigation in the Montgomery
;chool desegregation case in 0. M. Fiss, Injunctions (Mineola, New York: The
oundation Press, Inc., 1972), at 415-8 1. These cases are based upon a violation of
he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and are said to involve
he federal court in "novel and overwhelming tasks" which subject the courts as
nstitutions to "strains never before experienced": A. Cox, infra, note 128 at
T7-90, esp. 86-88 [The Role of the Supreme Court... ].
i4. See Comment (J. Z. Johnson), Equitable Remedies: An Analysis of Judicial
itilization of Neoreceivorships to Implement Large Scale Institutional Change,
1976] Wisc. L. Rev. 1161.
i5. For an example of the mixed feelings surrounding "busing", see Norwalk
yore v. Norwalk Boardof Education(1968), 298 F. Supp. 208 (D. Conn.).
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Natural Gas Co. 66 raises the issues surrounding a court order
enjoining an antitrust violation and directing divestiture. When a
merger which is held to be illegal has operated for a number of
years, the task of allocating assets and dealing with new acquisitions
(such as, in this case, new gas reserves discovered by the merged
company) is difficult and, to be done properly, requires
considerable information about the defendant's operations and the
industry in general. To meet the objective of restoring competition
to the market, the court must play a creative and an expanded role in
ensuring proper factual information comes forward and in
fashioning relief which is effective in creating the competitive
balance.
How can these examples be squared with the traditional view of
the injunctive device embraced by the Dispute Settlement
paradigm? Under formal notions an injunction is seen as an
extraordinary remedy, 6 7 not to be granted where other "adequate
relief' is available. Since the focus is upon righting the position of
the particular plaintiff, the payment of damages to him is usually
considered sufficient. Thus, there exists a judicial preference for
compensation. This notion of extraordinariness culminated in
various formulae which acted to restrict the availability of
injunctions: the injury must be irreparable (i.e. an injunction will
only be granted where damages will not be adequate);68 equity only
grants negative relief (i.e. it would act preventively to prohibit an
act but was reluctant to act restoratively to order an affirmative act
to be done)6 9 equity would not enjoin a crime; 70 equity would not
66. (1967), 386 U.S. 219. See also U.S. v. United Shoe Machiney Corp. (1953),
110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.), affd per curiam (1954), 347 U.S. 521 and, upon
later Government petition for further relief, (1968), 391 U.S. 244.
67. See, e.g. A.-G. v. Wellington Colliery Co. (1903), 10 B. C. R. 397 (S.C.) at
403; The City of Lethbridge v. The CanadianWestern Natural Gas, Light, Heat
andPowerCo., Ltd, [1923] S. C. R. 652, [1923] 4 D. L. R. 1055
68. See, e.g. T. W. Taylor, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence (Toronto:
Willing and Williamson, 1875) at 297-98; Moren v. Shelburne Lumber Co. et al.
(Circa 1874), Ritchie's E. D. (N. S. S. C., in Eq.);Londonand Blackwell Railway
Co. v. Cross (1885), 31 Ch. D. 354 at 369 (per Lindley, L. J.); Kerr on Injunctions
(6th ed. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1927) at 17-18; Wood v. Sutcliffe (1851), 21
L. J. Ch. 253
69. See, e.g. Taylor, id. at 283; Kerr, id. at 40 et seq.; Hanbury and Maudsley,
Modern Equity (10th ed. London: Stevens and Sons, 1976) at 75-77, 87-88, 90-91;
Snell's Principlesof Equity (27th ed. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1973) at 624,
635-36,641
70. See, e.g. Wellington Colliery, supra, note 67 at 404; Robinson v. Adams,
[1925] 1 D. L. R. 359 (Ont. C. A. ) at 364-65
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make a decree it cannot supervise; 7 1 equity would only act to protect
2
property rights. 7
The preceding American illustrations negate the idea of equitable
remedies as "extraordinary" and ignore the above-noted cautionary
formulations. 73 There is no aversion to affirmative orders. The
objective is to attain and maintain compliance with the norms of
proper conduct, and the court goes beyotid restraining the
commission of the prohibited conduct. The complex wrong
necessitates complex relief. The decree seeks through explicit
directions to revise and reorder the wrong-doer's conduct so as to
conform unequivocally with legal requirements. Since there are
many schemes which could meet the test of proper conduct, the
content to be put into the order is indeterminate, and the subject of
negotiation. To do its job properly, the Court must be thoroughly
familiar with the defendant's operation. Hence, a deep, judicial
inquiry into the wrongdoer's affairs is mandatory. A feeling
pervades that it is unwise to enjoin the defendant in a simple way
and permit him to devise his own scheme. It is likely hostile to any
change, and if the defendant "misjudges" what is sufficient
compliance, delay will result. A preference for early and thorough
compliance is a touchstone of the Enforcement approach. While
protection is consequently afforded the plaintiff, the fundamental
object is protection of the public interest. In addition, since the
decree is often future-oriented, the Court is concerned about the
on-going effects and effectiveness of its order. It will often
supervise or oversee its operation, perhaps through masters,
refeerees or experts. In short, the Court through affirmative
directions intrudes greatly into the defendant's conduct of its affairs
and becomes entangled with the parties.
It should be noted that a shift from Dispute Settlement's
preference for damages to Enforcement's preference for injunctive
relief marks a significant change in attitude toward the wrongful
conduct being examined. When damages are found to be
appropriate, one is in effect providing a licence to the defendant to
71. See, e.g. Canadian Western Natural Gas, supra, note 67 at 1058 [D. L. R.];
4.-G. v. StraffordshireCounty Council, [1905] 1 Ch. D. 336 at 342; Hanbury and
Maudsley, supra, note 69 at 75
72. See, e.g. Wellington Colliery, supra, note 67 at 404; Rowe v. Hewitt (1906),
12 0. L. R. 13 (H. Ct.); Kerr, supra, note 68 at 15-16
73. See also A. Chayes, supra, note 10 at 1292; Note, Developments in the
Law-Injunctions (1964-65), 78 Harv. L. Rev. 994 passim
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continue with his wrongful conduct. The defendant may choose to
pay the damages and continue his activity, regardless of the
preferences of the victim. 74 To adopt the economist's analysis:
Where compensatory damages are the standard remedy for a
breach of legal duty, the effect of liability is not to compel
compliance with law but to compel the violator to pay a price
equal to the opportunity cost of the violation. If that price is lower
than the value he derives from the unlawful act, then efficiency is
maximized if he commits it, and the legal system encourages him
to do so; if higher, efficiency requires that he not commit the act
....
Like the market, the legal system confronts the individual
with the costs of his
act but leaves the decision whether to incur
75
those costs to him.
If the full cost of the external harm caused by his activities are
returned to the wrongdoer, an efficient allocation of resources is
promoted. On the other hand, if considerations other than efficiency
are to be promoted, damages may not be appropriate. When law
specifies norms of proper conduct, it is in effect creating
entitlements. And while entitlements are sometimes protected by
76
awarding damages, they are much better protected by injunctions.
Canadian examples of this form of complex injunctive relief are
not apparent. Amongst recent academic comments, there are few
concerning injunctions. Those that exist tend to reinforce the
74. This point was made as early as 1877 inKrehl v. Burrell, 7 Ch. D. 551 at 554
(per Jessel, M. R.):
"... [T]he question I have to consider is, whether the Court ought to exercise
the discretion given by the statue by enabling the rich man to buy the poor man's
property without his consent, for that is really what it comes to. If with notice of
the right belonging to the Plaintiff, and in defiance of that notice, without any
reasonable ground, and after action brought, the rich Defendant is to be entitled
to build up a house of enormous proportion, at an enormous expense, and then
to say in effect to the Court, 'You will injure me a great deal more by pulling it
down than you will benefit the poor man by restoring his right', - of course
that simply means that the Court in every case, at the instance of the rich man, is
to compel the poor man to sell him his property at a valuation. That would be
the real result of such a decision."
For a similar evaluation of the choices confronting a Court but a decision allowing
the defendant to continue in his wrongful activity, see Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Co. (1970), 26 N.Y. 2d 219, 257 N.E. 2d 870, 309 N.Y.S. 2d 312.
75. R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2nd ed. Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1977) at 399.
76. See G. Calabresi and A. D. Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral(1972), 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089.
For an early recongition of the "necessity for specific [equitable] remedies to
protect interests of a public or social nature adequately" and a reaction against
formal views of their availability, see H. E. Read, Equity and Public Wrongs
(1933), 11 Can. B. Rev. 73, 158, 249, at 76.
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f6rmalistic views surrounding their use. 77 The formal verbal
formulae, especially extraordinariness 78 and irreparability,7 9 are
given their due. A preference in Canada for narrow, specifically
tailored relief is evident ° However, the outer boundary enclosing
the Dispute Settlement Model has been breached. Some of the force
of the above-noted traditional formulae has been eroded. 8 ' And an
77. 'W. B. Williston, Injunctions (1961), Lectures L.S.U.C. 81; K.P. Swan, The
Labour Injunction in Alberta (1971), 9 Alta. L. Rev. 1; Note (E. N. McKelvey),
The Appropriatenessof the Injunction in Labour Disputes (1968), 18 U.N.B.L.J.
114; Note (E.L. Teed), The Ex ParteInjunction-Use andAbuse (1968), Points on
2n Application for an Interlocutory,Injunction (1971), 29 Advocate (Van. B.A.)
71. For a less formal but nonetheless restrictive view that injunctions should be
used sparingly, see B. L. Strayer, InjunctionsAgainst Crown Officers (1964), 42
Can. B. Rev. 1.
78. See, e.g. Gretzk3' et al. v. Ontario Minor Hockey Assoc. et al. (1975), 24
C.P.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. H. Ct.) at 277; Organizing Committee of the 1976 Olympic
games v. Exclusive Leather Products Corp. et al. (1974), 20 C. P. R. (2d) 174
rQue. Super. Ct.) at 177-78
79. See, e.g. Labelle et al. v. Ottawa Real Estate Boardet al. (1977), 78 D. L. R.
'3d) 558 (Ont H. Ct.); Universal City Studios Inc. v. 309848 Ont. Ltd. (1975), 24
D. P. R. (2d) 278 (Fed. Ct.); TenatronicsLtd. v. Haufet al. (1971), 23 D. L. R.
'3d) 60 (Ont. H. Ct.); Adrian Messenger Services et al. v. Jockey Club Ltd. et al.
1970), 16D. L. R. (3d) 121 (Ont. H. Ct.)
30. See, e.g. R. v. Ocean Const. Supplies Ltd. etal. (1974), 18 C. P. R. (2d) 166,
Z2 C. C. C. (2d) 340 (B. C. C. A.); affirming 15 C. P. R. (2d) 224 (anti-combines
rohibition order granted at trial in the same wording as authorizing section of Act
ind on appeal additional terms sought by Crown refused); R. v. F. W. Woolworth
7o. Ltd. (1974), 46 D. L. R. (3d) 345 (Ont. C. A.) at 357 (anti-combines
,rohibition order "must relate to the continuation or repetition of the offence for
,vhich the conviction was made"; it must "bear a proper relationship in its terms to
be terms of the offence charged in the information" and deal only with the "class
)f goods which were the subject matter of the charge.")
31. See, e.g. R. v. Browning Arms Co. of CanadaLtd. (1974), 18 C. C. C. (2d)
198, 15 C. P. R. (2d) 97 (Ont. C. A. ) (comments that the granting of a prohibition
irder under the Combines Investigation Act against repetition or continuance now
akes place almost as a matter of course); Masson v. The GrandJunction R. W. Co.
1879), 26 Gr. 286 and note 289 (Ont. C. A.) (mandatory interlocutory injunction
,ranted requiring defendant railway to erect fences as required under statute
tuthorizing compulsory acquisition of land); Snarr v. The Granite Curling and
kating Company (1882), 1 0. R. 102 and note 107 (Ch. D.) (order directed to be
Irawn in a form commanding defendant to restore land to former condition rather
han in the form of restraining defendant from suffering it to remain otherwise than
n its former condition); Sutton and Sutton v. Vanderburg, [1946] 0. R. 497,
1946] 3 D. L. R. 714 (H. Ct.) (mandatory interlocutory injunction granted
lirecting defendant to deliver up possession of the premises to the plaintiffs); Gross
,. Wright, [1923] 2 D. L. R. 171, [1923] S. C. R. 214 (mandatory injunction
ranted compelling removal of a wall); Epstein et al. v. Reymes (1972), 29 D. L.
t. (3d) I (S. C. C.) at 8 (commenting that the "absence of physical iniury or
roperty damage does not affect the right to an injunction where there is conduct,
.ot merely temporary, which materially interfers with the comfort and enjoyment
,f living in the locality", the Court enjoined noise caused by commerical hunting
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increasing tendency to use equitable devices as Enforcement tools
seems apparent. Most of these developments stem from legislative
activity, providing the norms of public conduct which underline
making statutory
complex injunctive relief, and sometimes also in 82
provision for enforcement through equitable relief.
activities); Re CanadianJavelinLtd. andBoon-Strachan Coal Co. Ltd. (1976), 69
D. L. R. (3d) 439 (Que. Super. Ct.) (extensive court intervention and supervision
of company's affairs under statutory power); Re Peterson et al. and Kanata
Investments Ltd. et al. (1975), 60 D.L.R. (3d) 527 (B.C.S.C.) (Court orders
majority shareholders to sell their interest in company and appoints receivermanager under wide statutory power); Re Regina and Odeon Morton Theatres Ltd.
etal. (1973), 42 D. L. R. (3d) 471 (Man. C. A.) (right of A.-G. to maintain a civil
action for an injunction to restrain an illegal act which affects the public generally);
Adrian Messenger Services, supra, note 79 (Court enforced right of entry to, and
use ofparimutuel facilities at, a racetrack).
82. The outer limits of Canadian developments in using intrusive, affirmative
equitable relief are illustrated by the following: (a) The government's unsuccessful
attempt to challenge the Irving newspaper interests in New Brunswick under the
monopoly provisions of the Combines InvestigationAct. Initially K. C. Irving Ltd.
was convicted of holding a monopoly position, and sentencing was deferred: 13 C.
P. R. (2d) 115 (N.B.S.C.,Q.B.D.). 'Upon its appeal from the conviction, K. C.
Irving Ltd. was successful: II N.B.R. (2d) 181 (N.B.S.C., A.D.). The
government then appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Canada, where K.
C. Irving Ltd. again prevailed: 15 N.B.R. (2d) 450. However, before Irving's
appeal was heard in the Appeal Division of the New Brunswick Supreme Court, the
trial judge in a separate opinion dealt with sentencing: 61 D.L.R. (3d) 11. He made
a prohibition order requiring dissolution of the monopoly he had found at trial. In
so doing, he relied upon s. 30(1) of the Combines Investigation Act. The order
directed the sale of two of the newspapers involved, namely, the two Moncton
English language dailies. The Court also specifically retained jurisdiction to
enforce the sale requirement and said that its approval of the terms of the sale was
required if the Crown objected to them. The subsequent decision dealt only with the
conviction and left the sentencing decision uncriticized.
(b) It appears that divestiture or dissolution of mergers and monopolies has, with
the exception of this case, never been ordered. See W. T. Stanbury, Penaltiesand
Remedies Under the Combines Investigation Act 1889-1976 (1976), 14 Osgoode
Hall L. J. 571 at 578.
(c) R. v. CanadaSafeway Ltd. (1973), 41 D.L.R. (3d) 264 (Alta. S. C.) utilized a
prohibition order against a monopoly in the retail grocery business. Proceedings
were taken there under s. 30 (2) of the Combines InvestigationAct, which allowed
such an order, upon information, without finding a criminal offence. (It was made
clear in R. v. Hemlock ParkCo-operative Farm Ltd. (1972), 24 D.L.R. (3d) 688
(S.C.C.) that a proceeding under s. 30(2) was in its nature civil, and not criminal).
With the defendant's consent, an order was entered prohibiting Canada Safeway
from doing certain specific acts in Calgary and Edmonton for varying periods of
years, including: meeting or undercutting competitiors' prices unless it charged this
price uniformly in all its stores, increasing the total square footage occupied by its
stores, entering into restrictive convenants in its leasing arrangements which
restricted competition in the vicinity of the leased premises, acquiring existing
competitors' businesses, and engaging in market saturation advertising.
(d) Stubbe et al. v. P. F. Collier and Son Ltd. (1977), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 605

An American Enforcement Model of Civil Process 101

Clearly, in comparsion with the expansive American injunctive
phenomena, these cases are undistinguished. Equally, what cause
there may be for anticipating wider resort to injunctions to enforce
norms of proper conduct must be based upon legislative activity.
Amongst the statutory underpinnings which would foster wider use
of complex injunctions is the proposed new s. 31.1 (1.1) of the
Second Stage Amendments to the Combines Investigation Act,
specifically authorizing, amongst other remedies, injunctions to
help enforce the competition laws. Other areas which come to mind
are human rights, consumer protection and environmental policy.
As society becomes increasingly complex, we may expect to see
even greater activity on the part of legislatures. And when such
public law schemes give rise to civil causes of action, 8 3 we may
expect to see private
forces aggressively seeking enforcement
84
through the courts.
(B.C.S.C.) involved deceptive acts or practices by a door-to-door encyclopaedia
sales company, contrary to British Columbia's Trade PracticesAct, Stats. B.C.
1974, c. 96. The Court examined particular practices of the defendant's salesmen,
such as: attempting to gain admittance to a house by suggesting that the purpose
was to conduct a survey of the effectiveness of a television advertising campaign,
falsely suggesting that the potential buyers were "qualified" to receive the benefit
of special terms, suggesting that the price was merely nominal by reference to the
daily cost of small items without immediately revealing the true total price,
suggesting that an encyclopaedia was new when it was in fact a revised version of
an older work. The Court declared these practices illegal and restrained their
repetition. As well, the plaintiff "in effect,.

. .

asked ...

Court [to] write part of

the sales presentation and order Collier to use it" (at 620). The Court held such a
mandatory injunction was unnecessary in this case and expressed some doubts
about whether such a mandatory direction was open to it under the section of the
Act authorizing injunctive relief.
(e) British Columbia's Human Rights Act, Stats. B.C. 1969, c. 10 [now repealed
and replaced by the Human Rights Code of British Columbia, Stats. B.C. 1973

(2nd Sess.), c. 119]. This statute empowered the Human Rights Commission, once
it was the opinion that a person had contravened the Act, to direct the person to
rectify the contravention [s. 14(6)]. In Re Lornex Mining CorporationLtd. and

Bukiva (1976), 69 D.L.R. (3d) 705 (B.C.S.C), "rectify" was intepreted by the
Court to mean "to put or set right; to remedy" and, in the context of a finding of
discrimination upon the basis of sex, the Commissioner's order to Lornex to "cease
the contravention by making camp accommodation available to female employees
on the same terms and conditions as male employees" was upheld by the Court.
See also I.A. Hunter, Civil Actions for Discrimination(1977), 55 Can. B. Rev.

106. For a similar example of a statutory scheme in vesting intrusive enforcement
power in an administrative agency see Ontario's The Environmental Protection
Act, 1971, Stats. Ont. 1971. c. 86 and Re Canada Metal Co. Ltd. et al. and
lIacFarlane(1973), 41 D.L.R. (3d) 161 (Ont. H. Ct.) (Director of Management

Branch, Ministry of Environment, has the power to issue stop orders).
33. Note the attempt in Valley Salvage Ltd. et al. v. Molson Brewery B.C. Ltd. et
21. (1975), 64 D.L.R. (3d) 734 (B.C.S.C.) to found a civil action upon an alleged
:onspiracy in breach of the Combines Investigation Act. See also Transport Oil,
Fnfra., note 123; DirectLumber, infra, note 123.
34. See, e.g. McCann et al. v. The Queen et al. where a civil action was
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V. Intervention
The broad nature of the wrong addressed and the equally broad
nature of the relief sought in a complex injunction setting point out
another problem: the decree granted will affect many people. Legal
relationships not directly under consideration in a particular suit,
such as contracts between defendants and third party absentees, 85
may be affected in a practical way by the suit. Or a point of law
peculiar to a particular fact situation may be decided in the first case
which, by making it difficult for an absentee to get a different ruling
in his case, may have a kind of state decisis impact upon another's
legal relationship.86 But the fallout from a complex injunction is
more than this. When conduct or activities which affect many
people are altered, the alteration will have a wide-ranging impact.
The relationships affected may be legal ones; most often they are
practical relationships. Judges are concerned about those absentees
suffering this litigious fallout. Scope for expressing this concern is
afforded by the injunctive device, which grant is premised upon a
balancing of the interests of the public as well as the plaintiff and
defendant, and which may be upon conditions. While some
accommodation of the interests affected might be made in the
decree, uncertainty surrounds what provisions ought to be inserted
into the injuction. Outsiders may also have a legitimate interest in
questions of liability as well as in those of remedy. Without some
representation concerning these impacts and interests and how they
can be taken into account, the judge is left to rely upon his intuition
and guesswork. This suggests a broader view might be taken of
commenced by inmates of the British Columbia Penitentiary at New Westminister
for a declaration, inter alia, that their confinement in solitary amounted to cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment contrary to s. 2(b) of the CanadianBill of Rights
Stats. Can. 1960, c. 44 as amended 1970-71-72, c. 38, s. 29. The Court agreed
with the plaintiffs on this aspect of their case and made the declaration, even though
the Plaintiffs were no longer in solitary confinement. The Court felt a declaration
should be made to give practical guidance to penitentiary authorities. This is similar
to the judicial reordering undertaken in the United States in relation to the operation
of mental hospitals: See Wyatt v. Stickney (1972), 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.).
See also A. Cox, infra, note 128 at 69, 71-73 [Proc. Mass. Hist. Soc.].
See also Re Schmidt and Calgary Board of Education (1975), 57 D.L.R. (3d)
746 (Alta. S.C.) where a private individual successfully appealed from a board of
inquiry's dismissal of his complaint. The appellant attacked a practice authorized
by the School Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 329 under which he was unable to enroll his
children in the public school system in Calgary because he was a Roman Catholic,
without paying "non-resident" fees. The School Act contemplated that he would
send his children to the separate Catholic school system. The provision of the
School Act was held inoperative and the Board of Education was ordered to cease
levying fees against the appellant and to refrain from similar contravention of the
Individual'sRights ProtectionAct.
85. See, e.g. U.S. v. CarterProducts,Inc. (1962), 211 F. Supp. 144 (S.D. N.Y.)
86. See, e.g. Atlantis Development Corp. v. U.S. (1967), 379 F. 2d. 818 (5th
Cir.)
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intervention by third parties in complex cases to allow a range of
interests to be represented.
An example from the environmental context is provided by the
well-known Reserve Mining87 litigation. Involved here was an
attempt by the federal authorities to abate the discharge into Lake
Superior of taconite tailings left from the process of concentrating
iron ore. Remedies appropriate for unlawful discharge ranged from
immediate abatement, which would result in the facility being
closed down, to gradual abatement, allowing the company to
arrange alternate disposal methods.8 8 If Reserve Mining were
closed, the employment of approximately 11,000 people would be
directly and indirectly affected. This resulted in eleven applications
being made by various municipal units, chambers of commerce and
a development association to intervene on behalf of the defendent
Reserve Mining. Lord, J., in allowing the entrace of these parties,
considered "it imperative for the Court to obtain the fullest possible
factual understanding of the conditions in North-eastern Minnesota
before rendering any judgement. '"89 The intervenors were considered advisors to the Court, as in an administrative proceeding, as
well as litigants. Traditional concepts of adversariness, Lord, J.,
believed, ought not to restrict their access to the Court. Although
the intervenors had no legal interest to be protected, the economic
impact of the decision gave them sufficient practical interest to
justify intervention. On the other hand, the states of Wisconsin and
Michigan and several environmental organizations sought successfully to intervene to be heard in relation to upholding the
environmental laws. After finding, perhaps somewhat artifically,
that each had a separate interest, the Court went on to conclude that
exisiting parties did not represent these interests. Each party
permitted to intervene had a particular viewpoint which they wished
addressed, and those already parties would not adequately represent
this viewpoint as their particular interest diverged somewhat. In this
respect, the Court here emphasized the divergent views being put
forward on the question of the specific form of abatement to be
applied and the criticism which had been levelled at some of the
positions taken by the government. The wider range of advocacy
which would be brought as a result of the different orientations of
the intervenors could prove helpful to the Court in its deliberations
on this issue. Hence, intervention was allowed; a preference for
multiple advocacy was demonstrated.
A further illustration is provided by Hodgson and Trbovich et al.
v. United Mine Workers of America.9 0 This decision involved
87. U.S. v. Reserve Mining Co. (1972), 56 F. R. D. 408 (D. Minn.)
88. For a similar kind of option, see Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., supra, note

74.

89. Supra, note 87 at 4 15

90. (1972), 473 F. 2d 118 (D. C. Cir.)
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motions to intervene by union members in a suit which had been
brought by the Secretary of Labor against the U.M.W.A. to lift
allegedly unlawful trusteeships that the U.M.W.A. had imposed
upon seven districts. The members seeking intervention were from
these districts, and desired to participate only in the remedial, and,
if necessary, the appellate phase of the case. While the Secretary of
Labour also sought effective dismantling of the trusteeships and the
holding of proper elections to return local control, the Court did not
believe his representation on these issues would be adequate to
protect the intervenors' interests. The Court argued, in part, that the
Secretary served "in a dual capacity as a public official and as the
union members' lawyer"91 and each function would not necessarily
dictate the same approach to the conduct of the litigation. The Court
concluded that intervention implements
the basic jurisprudential assumption that the interest of justice is
best served when all parties with a real stake in a controversy are
afforded an opportunity to be heard. We think appellants are
entitled to intervene in the Secretary's suit in order to assure that
their interest in effective dismantling of the unlawful trusteeships
is safeguarded at this particularly crucial stage of
in their districts
92
the case.
Again the intervenors had no personal, legal interest, although the
result of the Secretary's suit would have a resjudicataeffect. 9 3 The
practical nature of the intervenor's interest again provides a basis for
permitting intervention and increasing the advocacy orientations
94
presented to the Court.
In contrast, the Dispute Settlement model frowns upon
91. Id. at 130 [Emphasis in original].
92. Id.
93. Id. at 129.
94. An important, earlier companion case to this one, decided in the Supreme
Court, also illustrates the points made in this paragraph: Trbovich v. United Mine
Workers of America (1972), 404 U.S. 528. This case involved intervention by the
union member upon whose complaint the Secretary of Labor brought suit to set
aside an union election of officers. As a result a detailed and comprehensive order
was issued dealing with the supervision of a new election and the preservation of
union assets. Trbovich had no standing to maintain a suit himself. See also
Comment ( J. A. Weinberg), Trovich v. United Mine Workers of America: Move
Over Mr. Secretary - A Union Member May Intervene in Suits Under Title IV of
the LMRDA (1973), 41 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 560.
See also Ford Motor Co. v. Bisanz Bros. (1957), 249 F. 2d 22 (8th Cir.) where
intervention was permitted by a business, dependant upon the use of certain railway
track but without a legally protectable interest in the use, in a suit brought by
surrounding property owners to enjoin the railway from maintaining the tracks.
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intervenors. A premium is placed upon party control and the Court
tends not to allow "meddlers" into what is seen as a private lawsuit
without the parties' concurrence. 9 5 If the intervenors have no legal
interest which would be legally affected by the action, the Court
will relegate them to their own suit at a latter time when they can
then have their day in Court if they wish. As for practical effects
upn pvaetical ititerests, the other end of the spectrum, this is not
something of which the law takes cognizance. The device of
intervention, it would be argued, may not be used to give someone
standing who would never have otherwise been able to maintain his
own suit.
It is important to underscore this last point. While the plaintiffs in
Hodgson and Trbovich could have maintained under certain
circumstances their own suit because of statutory authorization, we
are generally speaking about allowing party status to those who
could neither maintain their own suit against the defendant nor be
subject to liability at the hands of the plaintiff. To thus allow
intervention effectively strips away the cloud of privacy which
encompasses the traditional lawsuit and allows the light cast by the
public nature of the controversy to penetrate to the core of the
proceedings. Something more than a Dispute Settlement notion of
the purpose of civil litigation is needed to explain this. Again an
Enforcement model provides coherence.
The Enforcement paradigm shows a preference for multiple
advocacy. It seeks to enforce compliance with public policies, and
in doing this, a Court needs to understand the policies and
circumstances, resolve any conflict between competing policies,
and take cognizance of any adverse effects of its action that can be
fairly accommodated. The more unrepresented interests upon which
advocacy is received, the better the informational base from which a
sound judgement can be made and a sound decree structured. A
breadth of representation helps resolve some of the uncertainty
which surrounds a complex situation. 96
95. See, D. L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies
and Arbitrators(1968), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 721 at 721.
96. See id. for advocacy of an approach to intervention based upon an assessment
of the intervenor's interst, the adequacy of representation of that interest by existing
parties, the degree to which the intervenor could contribute to the resolution of the
dispute, and any prejudice which might result to the original parties. The extent of
participation permitted to the intervenor would be determined on the basis of the
reason why intervention was allowed.
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In Canada, the Dispute Settlement view clearly holds the field. 97
Little evidence exists of a liberal use of the intervention device at
the trial level 98 . There is, however, a fairly common practice by the
Supreme Court of Canada to permit intervention in constitutional
cases and those involving the Canadian Bill of Rights. 9 9 As this
practice filters down to the provincial courts, and as the judiciary
there become more comfortable with the notion, we might expect to
see a wider range of interests being represented through
intervention.
97. Intervention by uninvited third parties into Canadian law suits upon their own
motions is not a wide-spread phenomena. For example, Ontario's Rules ofPractice
have no express provision permitting third persons to be added as co-defendants
upon their own application, although intervention is sometimes allowed. See 2
Holmested and Gale, supra, note 23 at 1113-15 and Cum. Supp. to Vol. 2 at 11-12
andRe Damien and OntarioHuman Rights Commission (1976), 12 0. R. (2d) 262
(H. Ct., Div. Ct.) (where Ontario Racing Commission allowed to intervene in suit
brought by their former employee against Human Rights Commission to force them
to act upon complaint that he was discharged because he was a homosexual). On
the other hand, Nova Scotia has a rule allowing intervention, inter alia, where a
person "claims an interest in the subject matter of the proceeding": Rules of Civil
Procedure, R. 8.01. See Connoret al. v. MacCulloch et al. (1974), 16 N.S.R. (2d)
172 (S.C.) (where intervention understandably refused) and Halifax FlyingClub v.
Maritime Builders Ltd. (1973), N.S.R. (2d) 364 (S.C.) (where intervention
allowed.)
98. The strongest example which has come to my attention is Re Attorney-General
for Alberta and Gares, (1976), 67 D.L.R. (3d) 635 (Alta. S. C.) which allowed
three private entities and one public administrative board to join as party
intervenors and another public administrative board to participate as amicus curiae.
There is, of course, widespread resort to intervention by insurance companies in
cases where they wish to defend their insured against the plaintiff's claims without
precluding themselves from denying their own liability under the insurance
contract. Such intervention, however, is statutorily authorized by provincial
insurance laws. See, e.g. The Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, s. 225 and W.
D. Griffiths, Automobile Insurance -Part III (1962), Lectures L.S.U.C. 57 at
72-75.
Also note CanfargeLtd. v. Newman et al. (1974), 51 D. L. R. (3d) 759 (Sask. C.
A.) where an application by A.-G. Sask to intervene in and reopen an appeal was
denied with the comment, at 761: "To suggest that the Attorney-General intervene
any time he believes a Court has misinterpreted a provincial statute, is a proposition
lacking any judicial support and one to which I cannot subscribe.".
99. See, e.g. McNeil, supra, note 58 (intervention by A.-G.'s for Ont., Alta.,
Sask., and Canada and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association); Morgentaler v.
The Queen (1975), 53 D. L. R. (3d) 161 (S. C. C.) (intervention by A.-G. Can.,
Foundation of Women in Crisis, Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Alliance for
Life, Association des M6decins du Qu6bec, Front Commun pour le Respect de la
Vie, and Foundation pour la Vie).
For an example from the provincial context where constitutional questions were
raised, seeRe Official Languages Act (1972), 5 N. B. R. (2d) 653 (N. B. S. C., A.
D.) at 659 where the Mayor of Moncton was allowed to intervene, apparently to
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VI. Standing
The American phenomena surrounding class actions, complex
injunctions and intervention have served as the main catalysts to the
formulation of the Enforcement model of civil process. However,
this paradigm gains support from and has implications for many
other aspects of procedure. I now propose to turn from the
American material and look briefly at Canadian doctrine in relation
to the questions of standing and non-compensatory damages.
New life was injected into the possibility of private suits by
citizens to enforce compliance with the law by the recent decision of
the Supreme Court in Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil.1 0 0
This case involved the standing of a private citizen to challenge by
way of declaration the constitutionality of the Nova Scotia Theatres
and Amusements Act' 0 1 and certain regulations thereunder. The
Supreme Court, having had the benefit of two lower court
opinions, 10 2 agreed that McNeil did have the necessary locus
standi. The judgement of the Court, delivered by Laskin, C.J.C.,
while somewhat cryptic in its reasoning, seems to say that as there
was an arguable case for the unconstitutionality of the provincial
law and as the members of the public were "directly affected" by
the law, then
"this is enough, in light of the fact that there appears to be no
other way, practically speaking, to subject the challenged Act to
judicial review, to support the claim of the respondent to have the
discretion of the Court exercised in his favour to give him
standing." 10 3
present "the contentions of those who have questioned the legislative competence
of Parliament and the legislatures in the matter of the use of languages in court
proceedings."
See the comment of Chief Justice Laskin that where constitutionality is an issue in
appellate adjudication "intervention is permitted to any government which is not a
party" but if merely the construction and application of legislation is at issue,
governments who are not parties must "be spectators, however interested they may
be in the outcome." He also notes that the Supreme Court "has opened to a degree
the door to intervention by responsible and interested organizations in litigation
raising issues under the Canadian Bill of Rights": B. Laskin, A Judge and his
Constituencies(1976-77), 7 Man. L. J. at 9, 11.
100. Supra, note 58
101. R.S.N.S. 1967, c.304, as amended by Stats. N. S. 1972, c. 54
102. Re MacNeil et al. v. Nova Scotia Board of Censors et al. (1974), 9 N. S. R.
(2d) 506, 46 D. L. R. (3d) 259 (N. S. S. C., in Chambers); Re MacNeil et al. v.
Nova Scotia Boardof Censors et al. (1974), 9 N. S. R. (2d) 483, 53 D. L. R. (3d)
259 (N. S. S. C., A.D.)
103. Supra, note 58 at 637 [D. L. R. (3d)]
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While the decision leaves many questions still unanswered as to
when the Court will exercise its discretion to grant standing, 10 4 it is
interesting to note the emphasis given to the efforts made by McNeil
to have the matter resolved in another fashion before he commenced
his action, McNeil had sought a statutory appeal to the
Lieutenant-Governor in Council and had requested the provincial
Attoney-Geeral to make a coaestixtioa refere ce. The COwt
noted the unresponsive reception these efforts had met. 10 5 The
Court appears, tacitly, to be concerned that without granting
standing, a court would not have an opportunity to pass upon the
impugned statute. In this light, the Court's statement that the merits
of the constitutional issue should be heard at the same time that the
standing issue is determined' 0 6 takes on new meaning. As David
Mullan comments:
If the Chief Justice really intends the question of standing and the
merits of a case to be always tried together, there are difficulties
in seeing any continued relevance to problems of standing. It
would after all be quite unusual to see a court finding a statute
refusing a remedy on the basis of an
unconstitutional and then
07
absence of standing. 1
A preference for upholding the law is likely to be operative under
such conditions. In addition, the McNeil case, like its progenitor
Thorson'0 8 , is difficult to square with a Dispute Settlement model
of civil adjudication.
Dispute Settlement views the plaintiff's personal stake or direct
interest in the subject matter of his grievance as the pedestal upon
which the dispute rests. If it is a pecuniary interest then so much the
stronger the base. If, as is often the case where constitutional
questions or public rights are involved, the plaintiff's interest is no
different or greater than that of other members of the public, then he
has no personal dispute and his grievance is not legally cognizable.
104. For an analysis of this case (and the equally significant Thorson, supra, note
4) and the considerations which apparently will affect the exercise of the Court's
discretion in relation to granting standing, see D. Mullan, Standing Afer McNeil
(1976), 8 Ottawa L. Rev. 32
105. Supra, note 58 at 634 [D. L. R. (3d)]. The same concern for the refusal of
appropriate law enforcement officials to act underlies Thorson, supra, note 4
106. Id.
107. D. Mullan, supra, note 104 at 42
108. Supra, note 4. Thorson was also a constitutional challenge by a citizen, in
this instance of the federal government's Official LanguagesAct, R. S. C. 1970, c.
0-2
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The proper protection for the public is then said to be through
proceedings by the Attorney-General. It is the personal interest of
the plaintiff which guarantees, it is thought, a high level of
advocacy and ensures that frivolous cases that waste judicial
resources are not brought. A private individual is thought unfit to
provide the breadth of view necessary to represent the public
itterest.
The Enforcement view focuses upon the defendant and his
wrongful conduct. It sees it as essential to the judicial role that the
Court act to ensure that violations of the law are censured, and not
sanctioned by its refusal to act. Since we have not, except in the
contempt field, adopted an approach where the Court can seek out
and obtain retribution from wrongdoers on its own initiative, an
Enforcement orientation indicates that the Court should be
hospitable to a plaintiff who brings both the wrong and the
wrongdoer before it. This is especially so where the plaintiff has
enough interest of whatever nature to finance his suit, to assume the
prime burden of proving the wrong, to supply an energized
advocacy, and to undertake the risk of costs if he loses.
Permitting a private citizen to directly challenge the constitutionality of legislation simply is not compatible with the Dispute
Settlement view. He is without a personal or private dispute with the
governmental authorities. Any detriment which he suffers is the
same as that under which all members of the public must labour.
While good policy arguments might be made to permit him access
to the courts ,109 the phenomena of doing so suggests a concern on
the part of the courts for enforcing constitutional requirements.
The logical extension to permitting private standing to challenge
constitutionality is to permit private standing to challenge ultra vires
action purported to be taken under admittedly constitutional
legislation. Thus far the judicial response has been mixed. The
109 At the minimum, it might be noted that in cases like McNeil, the protector of
the right of citizens of Nova Scotia to be free from unconstitutional provincial laws
is the provincial Attorney-General, who is also a cabinet member of the
government whose laws are sought to be challenged. His reluctance to challenge a
law supported by his government is understandable, as is his reluctance to see
provincial de facto powers limited by judicial decision. So much is the latter the
case that other provincial attornies-general intervened in McNeil to uphold the
provincial law. Indeed, even if a provincial Attorney-General did undertake to
challenge the constitutionality of a provincial statute, a plausible argument for a
conflict of interest on his part might be made. Some recognition of these difficulties
is reflected in Thorson, supra, note 4 at 146 [S .C. R.].

110 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Ontario Court of Appeal has not permitted the extension'" but the
Manitoba Court of Appeal seems to be in favour of standing in this

situation.111

Standing to challenge ultra vires action is one question; standing
to enforce public rights generally is a much broader extension of the
McNeil and Thorson line. 112 This latter position is tempered by the
110. In Rosenburg v. Grand River Conservation Authority (1976), 1 C.P.C. I
(Ont. C.A.) the plaintiffs sought to sue as "members" of the Authority on behalf
of all its members to restrain a proposed conveyance of land by the Authority which
was alleged to be beyond its powers. Arnup, J.A., delivering the Ontario Court of
Appeal's decision, characterized the action as really being brought on behalf of the
public generally, since success in the suit would bring no special benefit to the
plaintiffs beyond that accruing to the public generally. The proper plaintiff in such
a situation was said to be the Attorney-General. The plaintiffs were denied
standing, the Court concluding it had no discretion to permit standing where a
challenge was made to the exercise of delegated authority. McNeil and Thorson
were distinguished essentially because they involved constitutional issues and an
admitted refusal by the respective Attornies-General to take action. Arnup, J. A.,
did, however, go on to consider the merits of the challenge and to find that the
Authority acted within its statutory powers.
111. Stein v. City of Winnipeg (1974), 48 D.L.R. (3d) 223. There a private
individual brought a personal and class action seeking, by way of declaration and
injunction, to challenge the legality of a decision by the City of Winnipeg to
commence a tree spraying program to control tree-leaf eating insects. The plaintiff
contended that s. 653 of the City of Winnipeg Act, Stats. Man. 1971, c. 105,
requiring an assessment of the environmental impact, had not been met. Matas, J.
A., writing for a majority of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, stated that, by analogy
to Thorson,
"the right to institute Court action should not require the intervention by the
provincial Attorney-General..
and that ifs. 653,
"is not to be considered as a mere pious declaration then there must be inferred
case, tWhavte a
e io
nght, on tht art of tht iesidnt, in a a
a
question arising out of the sections [intended to involve citizen participation in
municipal government] adjudicated by the Court." [at 236].
At this stage the case involved an application for an interlocutory injunction,
which, on the balance of convenience, was refused. However, a private citizen was
given standing to challenge the exercise of subordinate, delegated authority without
the involvement of the Attorney-General, even though the plaintiffs suffered no
harm or injury different from that suffered by the public at large. The contrast
between Rosenburg and Stein might usefully be thought of as a debate between
Dispute Settlement and Enforcement orientations.
112. Such locus standi is accorded in some instances. Private actions by municipal
rate payers to attack public wrongs are now permitted almost as a matter of course.
See, e.g., Wilin ConstructionLtd. v. Dartmouth Hospital Commission (1977), 75
D. L. R. (3d) 145 (N. S. S. C.) (challenge to power of municipal hospital
commission to operate nursing home); Easton v. City of Winnipeg (1976), 69 D. L.
R. (3d) 585 (Man. C. A.) (challenge to municipal approval of bridge); Fraserv.
Town of New Glascow (1976), 76 D. L. R. (3d) 79 (N. S. S. C.) (challenge to
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notion that the public rights are to be enforced by public officials, in
particular, the Attorney-General. However, to allow a general
preference for enforcement of public rights by public officials is not
necessarily incompatible with an Enforcement model. What is
important, though, is that enforcement be achieved, and this makes
it important to permit private parties standing at least where an
official refuses to act (or perhaps has a potential conflict.) 1 13
Canadian jurisprudence has neither embraced nor foreclosed this
further extension along Enforcement lines of McNeil. 114 A decided
preference, however, for action by public officials to enforce public
rights is apparent. "15 Closely tied to this preference but reflecting an
authority of town to implement fluoridation programme); Brodie et al, v. City of
Halifax et al. (1974), 47 D. L. R. (3d) 454 (N. S. S. C., A. D.) (challenge to
municipal authorization of redevelopment project); Re Vladicka and board of
School Trustees of CalgarySchoolDistrict#19(1974), 45 D. L. R. (3d) 442 (Alta.
S. C.) (challenge to action of school board trustees setting their honoraria); Barber
v. Calvert et al. (1971), 17 D. L. R. (3d) 695 (Man. C. A.) (challenge to
qualification of mayor to hold office by reason of certain contracts entered into
between him and the town); cf. Pask v. McDonald (1974), 52 D. L. R. (3d) 762
(Sask. C. A.) (where, in an action to recover money paid to the mayor pursuant to
an allegedly invalid resolution, it was held that the rate-payer-plaintiff must prove a
request to the municipality to bring or join in action, and its refusal, before he has
standing). Consider also private actions by property owners to challenge building
permits issued in their zone. (L'Association des Proprietairesdes Jardins Tache
Inc. et al. v. Les EntreprisesDasken Inc. et al. (1971), 26 D. L. R. (3d) 79 (S. C.
C.) and shareholder derivative actions (See S. M. Beck, The Shareholders'
DerivativeAction (1974), 52 Can. B. Rev. 159).
113. See supra, note 109
114. See W. A. Bogart, Comment, Public Interest - Lucus Standi -Right of
PrivateCitizen to Litigate QuestionsInvolving Public Interest -Power of Court to
Review Decisionof Attorney General(1978), 56 Can. B. Rev. 331 (prediciting that
the influence of the strong statement of the House of Lords in Gourietv. Union of
Post Office Workers, [1977] 3 All E.R. 70 will restrict McNeil and Thorson to the
constitutional context.)
115. It is clear that the A.-G. as protector of public rights is entitled to an
injunction where a public statute is flouted: A.-G. Ont. v. Garbarchuk et al.
(1975), 110. R. (2d) 607, 67 D. L. R. (3d) 31 (Ont. H. Ct., Div. Ct.).
The classic Canadian statement relating to private action stems from Duff, J. in
Smith v. A.-G. Ontario, [1924] S. C. R. 331, [1924] 3 D. L. R. 189, at 337 [S. C.

R.]:

"An individual, for example, has no status to maintain an action restraining a
wrongful violation of a public right unless he is exceptionally prejudiced by the
wrongful act."
See Hickey et al. v. Electric Reduction Co. of CanadaLtd. (1970), 21 D. L. R.
(3d) 368 (Nfld. S. C.) (where fishermen whose livelihood was imparied by
discharge of poisonous material were denied standing as nuisance created was a
public one and not peculiar to them; the A.-G. is proper person to protect the
common interest of the public). See also Thorson, supra, note 4 at 150 [S. C. R.];
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intermediate position is the availability of relator actions. 116 In this
context it must be remembered that the decision to enforce public
rights or not is ultimately that of the Attorney-General. A refusal on
1 17
his part to act appears not to be usually reviewable by the Courts.
Of even greater consequence to an Enforcement view is the
standing of someone privately affected by a violation of a public
statute to enforce compliance. That is, in the case of a wrong
affecting the public generally, an Enforcer might be indifferent
between a suit commenced by the Attorney-General as protector of
the public interest into which a private party might intervene and a
private citizen's suit into which the Attorney-General might
intervene. Where, however, particular individuals or groups are
injured in their private capacities by a violation of a norm of public
conduct, it is important to an Enforcement view that they be able to
maintain a suit to enforce the norm through their personalized
advocacy. While clearly the proposition that such individuals have
standing is a correct statement of the law relating to public wrongs
created by the common law, problems might be raised where the
wrong is based on statutorily created wrongs. One might correctly
expect that where norms are specified by legislation but remedies
are not, those for whose benefit the statute is enacted may protest
when a violation affects them. 118 But when conduct is prescribed or
proscribed upon pain of penal consequences or some other remedy
is specified, did the legislature intend to exclude private civil
remedies?
Moose Jaw MerchandisersLtd. v. Westport EnterprisesLtd. (1971), 23 D. L. R.
(3d) 21 (Sask. C. A.); W. Estey, PublicNuisance and Standing to Sue (1972), 10
Osgoode Hall L. J. 563 at 566-75; D. Mullan The DeclaratoryJudgement: Its
Place as an AdministrativeLaw Remedy in Nova Scotia (1975-76), 2 Dal. L. 3. 91
at 100 et seq.; J. Swaigen and E. Block Standingfor Citizens: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come 1976), 10 Gazette L. S. U. C. 352.
An aberrant case where a private individual obtained an injunction to enforce a
public right without having a private interest or involving the A.-G. is Wright v.
The City of Sydney (1944), 18 M. P. R. 20 (N. S. S. C.). See Comment (P. R.
Jordon), Action by PrivatePerson to Establish a Public Right (1945), 23 Can. B.
Rev. 520 (who notes an appeal to N. S. S. C., A.D. was dismissed, and on further
appeal, the S. C. C. dimissed for want ofjurisdiction).
116. See, e.g A.-G. v. Bergan (1896), 29 N. S. R. 135 (C.A.); Merritt v. Chesley,
(1888) Tru. 324; Williams and Wilson Ltd. v. Toronto and A.-G. Ont., [1946] 0.
R. 309, [1946] 4 D. L. R. 278; A.-G. v. Crayford Urban DistrictCouncil, [1962]
Ch. 575 (C. A.).
117. See Gouriet, supra, note 114, at 83 and W. A. Bogart, supra, note 114 at
341-45
118. This is the so-called "second-class" from Wolverhampton New Waterworks
Co. v. Hawkesford (1859), 28 L. J. (C. P.) 242 at 246, 6 C. B. (N. S.) 336 at 356.
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A Dispute Settlement orientation would tend to see statutory
remedies as exclusive. The legislature has given the plaintiffs rights
which they would not have had at common law and has, it would be
said, placed limits upon those rights by virture of the means which it
has made available for their enforcement. If the parliamentarians
had intended to give the plaintiffs a civil right of action, they would
have said so when setting up the remedies they did. On the other
hand, an Enforcement view of civil process, concentrating upon
bringing about the defendant's compliance, would not be
particularly concerned about how compliance was achieved so long
as the method was effective. An injured private party ought to bring
a more effective, energized advocacy to bear. Where damages are a
question, public means of enforcement such as by way of a criminal
fine, might not effectively return to the wrongdoer the full measure
of the external harm his activity has caused. And perhaps the wrong
was of such a private nature that public injunctive relief would not
be available. If the mechanisms provided by the legislature prove
ineffective in any particular case, a per se rule excluding a private
damage and/or injunction suit would be objectionable.
Thus decisions like International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local Union 2085 et al v. Winnipeg Builders' Exchange
et all ' 9 provide an important base for further Enforcement
developments. This case concerned a work stoppage in violation of
both a collective agreement and the Manitoba Labour Relations
Act. 1 20 Involved was an interlocutory injunction granted ex parte
and then continued to trial. Despite the fact that the project
underlying the dispute had been completed and the injunction was
spent, the Supreme Court heard the case on its merits because "a
question of law of great and nation-wide importance was involved
as to which there was a difference of opinion in the Courts below
."121 In holding that the grant of an injunction was proper, even
though it in effect resulted in the enforcement of a contract for
personal services not otherwise specifically enforceable, the Court,
speaking through Cartwright, J., stated:
In my view the purposes of the LabourRelationsAct would be in
large measure defeated if the Court were to say that it is
powerless to restrain the continuation of a strike engaged in in
direct violation of a collective agreement binding on the striking
..

119. 11976) S. C.R. 628
120. R. S. M. 1954, c. 132
121. Supra, note 119 at 636
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employees and in breach of the express provisions of the
Act .... It is true that an employer whose operations are brought
to a standstill by an illegal strike or a union whose employees are
rendered idle by an illegal lockout may bring an action for
damages or seek to invoke the penal provisions of the Labour
Relations Act but the inevitable delay in reaching a final
adjudication in such procedures would have the result122that any
really effective remedy was denied to the injured party.
While the ability of a private party to so enforce public legislation in
the face of alternative statutory remedies depends upon a
view of
circumstance by circumstance analysis, this Enforcement
123
instance.
isolated
an
not
is
the use of civil procedure
122. Supra, note 119 at 640-41
123. See, e.g. Cunningham et al. v. Moore (1972), 31 D. L. R. (3d) 149 (Ont. H.
Ct.) (where Holland, J., in holding that a breach of the statutory duties created by
Ontario's LandlordandTenant Act, R. S. O. 1970, c. 236 gave rise to a civil cause
of action, despite other specific remedies being made available by the Act, stated at
151: "If a duty is imposed by statute then prima facie the plaintiff is entitled to
sueed upon showng a byeach of that avatzy duty itsulting I iury "ndamagz
to the plaintiff."); Stewart v. ParkManor Motors (1968), 66 D. L. R. (2d) 143
(Ont. C. A.) (where it was held that a duty to pay employees vacation pay under the
Hours of Work and Vacations with Pay Act, R. S. 0. 1960, c. 181 gave rise to a
civil cause of action in damages by an employee, despite the specific remedies
being made available by the Act); Tomko v. LabourRelations Board (Nova Scotia)
et al. (1975), 69 D. L. R. (3d) 250 (S. C. C.) at 256-58 (where, in the course of
upholding the constitutionality of the issuance of a cease and desist order by a
labour relations board, a court's power to issue an injunction against an unlawful
strike was recognized and Winnipeg Builders' Exchange was approved); The
Hamilton and Milton Rod Co. v. Raspberry (1887), 13 0. R. 466 (Ch. D.) (where
an injunction was granted restraining defendant from passing the plaintiff's tollgate
without paying tolls although such act by the defendant constituted a statutory
offence for which a statutory remedy by way of penalty was provided);
Grabarchuk, supra, note 115 (A.-G. entitled to iinjunction to secure compliance
with statue even though statue provided remedy for breach); A.-G. v. Chaudry et
al., [1971] 1 W. L. R. 1614 (C. A.) (per Lord Denning, M. R. at 1624:
"Whenever Parliament has enacted a law and given a particular remedy for the
breach of it, such remedy being in an inferior court, nevertheless the High Court
always has reserve power to enforce the law so enacted by way of an injunction or
declaration or other suitable remedy. The High Court has jurisdiction to ensure
obedience to the law whenever it is just and convenient so to do.");
R. K. Paterson, A Role ForCivil Liability in CanadianSecuritiesRegulation? Remedies for Breach of the Take-Over Bid Disclosure Requirements of the
Securities Act 1967 (1978), 12 U. B. C. L. Rev. 32. See also Stevens v. Chown,
[1901] 1 Ch. 894 at 905 (per Farwell, J.); A.-G. v. Sharp, [1931] 1 Ch. 121 (C.
A.); Duchess of Argyll v. Duke of Argyll, [1967] 1 Ch. 302; A.-G. v. Bastow,
[1957] 1 Q. B. 514, [1957] 1 All E. R. 497; Cooper v. Whittingham (1880), 15 Ch.
D. 501; A.-G. v. Ashbourne Recreation Ground Co.,119031 I Ch. 101; Insitute of
CharteredAccountants of Manitoba v. Bellamy, [1926] 4 D. L. R. 230; Snell's
Principlesof Equity, supra, note 69 at 627-28.
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VII. Damages
From a formal perspective, damages are seen solely as a means of
compensating the plaintiff for his loss from wrongful conduct. The
plaintiff is entitled to no more or no less than actual damages, as
best they can be calculated, for this is the measure of the plaintiff's
grievance which the Court seeks to resolve. The defendant is
obligated, under this view, to pay to the plaintiff no more than the
amount of loss he has inflicted upon him.
As has been emphasized, Enforcement is not overly concerned
about compensation but rather seeks to secure from the defendant
the full measure of the harm he inflicts in an effort to bring the
defendant into compliance and ensure he does so in the future. In
economic terms, it forces the defendant to internalize the external
costs he imposes in order that his private decision-making include
the true social costs, thus leading to an efficient allocation of
resources. Compensation is a distributional concern rather than one
of efficiency, and is not the stuff of which Enforcement is made.
While most rules relating to damages emphasize compensation to
the plaintiff, two important rules diverge from these notions and
extract from the defendant money over and above what compensation requires. Under the collateral benefit rule welfare payments
paid under statutory authority, unemployment insurance benefits,
private insurance payments and ex gratiapayments received by the
plaintiff as a result of his injury should not be deducted from his
claim for damages for personal injury and loss of earnings in
determining what amount the defendant should pay. 124 Under the
But see Transport Oil Ltd. v. Imperial Oil Ltd. et al., [1935] 0. R. 215, [1935] 2
D. L. R. 500 (Ont. C. A.) (where breach of a duty created by the Combines
Investigation Act was held not to give rise to a private right of action); Direct
Lumber Co. Ltd. v. Western Plywood Co. Ltd., [1926] S. C. R. 646, 35 D. L. R.
(2d) 1 (where a breach of sections of the Criminal Code was held not to give rise to
an action in damages); Valley Salvage, infra, note 83 (expressing doubt about
whether a conspiracy to violate the Combines InvestigationAct can form the basis
of a civil cause of action); Beattie et al. v. Governors of Acadia University et al.
(1976), 72D. L. R. (3d) 718 (N. S. S. C., A. D.) (where, in a civil action alleging
discrimination because of "race ... ethnic or national origin", contrary to the
Human Rights Act, Stats. N.S. 1969, c. 11, by virtue of being denied the right to
play on a university basketball team, doubt was expressed about the availability of
a declaration where a tribunal was especially charged with the administration of the
Act.)
124. The leading Canadian case on collateral benefits is Boarelli v. Flannigan,
(1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 4, a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal. Dubin, J.
A.'s analysis begins with a recognition of the underlying formal notions: that
personal injury damage awards are not to be "punitive"; that they are not to be a
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rules surrounding punitive or exemplary damages, more than the
plaintiff's loss is paid to him to punish the defendant for his
25
outrageous conduct. 1
reward; that they are to be compensatory only; and that "all that the defendant is
obligated to repay is the actual loss suffered by the plaintiff, but no more than his
loss." [at 7.3 Th I-atter statement, he belives, h2Ls never betn t 14w, 2Ld ht
concludes the payments in question were not deductible. The Court emphasizes that
there is no reason to allow the tortfeasor to obtain any advantage from these
payments and that "over-compensation" to the plaintiff is of no concern to a
defendant otherwise liable in damages [at 9, 14]. Boarelli has generally been
followed in Canada. See e.g. Wren v. Superintendentof Insurance(No. 2) (1977),
75 D. L. R. (3d) 567 (Ont. H. Ct.); Zinck v. Anderson and Anderson (1975), 20
N.S.R. (2d) 445 (S. C.) at 455. Academic commentary on the rule largely precede
Boarelli and include: G. Adair, CollateralSources in Damage Assessment (1967),
15 Chitty's L. J. 122; K. D. Cooper, A CollateralBenefits Principle (1971), 49
Can. B. Rev. 501 (the principle proposed therein was rejected inBoarelli,supra, at
11); E. L. Haines, FatalAccident Damages -Deductions for Contingencies and
Collateral Benefits (1973), Lectures L. S. U. C. 27. See most recently W. H.
Charles, Justice in PersonalInjury Awards: The ContinuingSearchfor Guidelines
at '14-S2, contained in Studies in Canadian Tort Law (L. M~ar ed. Toronto:
Butterworth & Co. (Canada) Ltd., 1977) at 37.
125. Exemplary or punitive damages are not new: Huckle v. Money (1763), 2
Wils. 205. In a contemporary article, S. L. Robins, Exemplary and Nominal
Damages (1961), Lectures L. S. U. C., 13, the author notes at the outset that the
traditional purpose of the law of damages is to compensate the plaintiff and place
him in the position he would have been in but for the wrongdoer's conduct.
Exemplary damages, he indicates, are not awarded with a compensatory objective
in mind. Rather, the "deterrent effect is stressed [footnote omitted], that is by
'punishing' the defendant he and other potential wrongdoers will be deterred from
further offences." [at 15] They are akin to a criminal fine and express the Court's
outrage at the defendant's reprehensible conduct. Or, to adopt an economist's
analysis, since the probability of a wrongdoer paying damages is less than one,
more than the actual costs of the undersired conduct must be imposed to properly
deter. See R. A. Posner, supra, note '75 at 142-43. While the availability of
exemplary damages was restricted in England by the House of Lords in Rookes v.
Barnard, [1964] A. C. 1129, many Canadian jurisdictions have not followed it.
See e.g. Gouzenko v. Lefolii (1967), 63 D.L.R. (2d) 217 (Ont. C.A.); Unrau v.
Barrowman (1966), 59 D.L.R. (2d) 168 (Sask. Q.B.); McKinnon v. F.W.
Woolworth Co. Ltd. et al. (1968), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 280 (Alta. S.C., A.D.); Fraser
v. Wilson et al. 1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 531 (Man. Q.B.); University of New
Brunswick v. Strax (1968), 1 N. B. R. (2d) 112 (S.C.). See contra Banks v.
Campbell (1973), 14 N. S. R. (2d) 73 (S. C.); Eagle Motors (1958) Ltd. v.
Makaoff(1970), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 222 (B.C.C.A)
For an analysis of Rookes v. Bernard, see G. H. L. Fridman, Punitive Damagesin
Tort (1970), 48 Can. B. Rev. 373; also R. B. Buglass. Some Thoughts on
Exemplary Damages (1969), 34 Sask. L. Rev. 325; J. J. Atrens, Intentional
Interference with the Person at 408 et seq., contained in Studies in CanadianTort
Law (A. M. Linden ed. Toronto: Butterworth & Co. (Canada) Ltd., 1968) at 378;
M. A. Catzman, Exemplary Damages: The Decline, Fall and Resurrection of
Rookes v. Bernard(1973), Lectures L. S. U. C. 41.
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To allow a plaintiff to recover more than his actual loss is to
depart from traditional notions of damage assessment. It is
submitted that the Enforcement model is helpful in showing why
these notions have been introduced into civil damage suits. By
extracting from the defendant the full measure of the costs of his
activity it is more likely to bring his conduct into conformity with
legally imposed norms. 2 6
IX. Conclusion: The Modesty of the Canadian Enforcement
Phenomena
This article has introduced an Enforcement model of civil process
and has indicated an increasing tendency to resort to the civil courts
as a means of dealing with problems often having a wide social
import, in which the public or a significant portion of it have an
interest. The cases deal with the operation of legislatively-declared
public policy. Yet it must be confessed that while the judiciary have
recognized and exercised a role beyond traditional Dispute
Settlement notions, the development of Canadian Enforcement
phenomena has been modest in comparison with the American
experience. The threads of an Enforcement model exist in Canada,
but why has a fuller cloth not been woven?
The answer to this question is complex, and no more than a
Even in Rooks v. Bernard, Lord Devlin, with whom all the other law lords
concurred in relation to exemplary damages, acknowledges, at 1221, that the object
of damages is to compensate and the object of exemplary damages is to punish and
deter, and goes on to state, at 1226, that:
".... an award of exemplary damages can serve a useful purpose in vindicating
the strength of the law and thus affording a practical justification for admitting
into the civil law a principle which ought logically to belong to the criminal."
126. This point was acknowledged in H. McGregor, Compensation Versus
Punishment in DamagesAwards (1965), 28 Mod. L. Rev. 629 at 632. There, in
relation to a more restrictive British position heralded by British Transport
Commission v. Gourley, [1956] A. C. 185 (H. L.) it is stated:
"Why, as a matter of policy rather than causation, should the court prefer one
solution [lightening the burden on the defendant] to the other
[over-compensating the plaintiff]? The answer of the earlier law - holding the
third party's action collateral and too remote - was based on the argument that
the defendant deserves to pay, as he is the tortfeaser and wrongdoer, and that as
between the plaintiff and defendant any windfall should go to the plaintiff. The
new view has laid bare the fallacy in this argument - that this whole approach
runs contrary to the basic idea that damages are compensatory and not
punitive."
For the economic justification, see R. A. Posner, supra, note 75 at 152-53.
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glimpse at some factors will be attempted. It is, however, important
to consider this question since the answers will reflect also on
another legitimate concern, namely, are the hurdles to development
so great as to make further Enforcement phenomena unlikely?
Although the hurdles are not insignificant, they do seem
surmountable.
Mr. Justice Born Laskin (as he then was), in commenting on the
greater involvement of the American courts in the formulation of
social policy, gave two reasons which are equally applicable to the
thesis expressed herein.12 7 The first is the unique role created for
the American courts by their constitutionally entrenched Bill of
Rights. When the judiciary, as the final arbiter, must uphold against
all legislative activity such majestic but open-ended concepts as
"life, liberty, or property", "due process" and "equal protection
of the laws," a deep sense of power, independence and
responsibility for upholding norms must become part of the judicial
personality. The Courts will naturally evolve whatever auxiliary
powers, procedures and remedies prove to be necessary to carry out
this function. The Courts must not await some kind of prior
legislative mandate or approval. (While I have deliberately steered
clear of emphasizing the operation of Enforcement phenomena in
American constitutional litigation, it nevertheless so operates.) 128 It
seems likely that the conception of its role as upholder of legal
norms, once shaped in the judicial mind by experience with
constitutional adjudication, would spill over into other litigation.
By contrast, the role of Canadian courts in constitutional matters
has been more limited. Our basic constitutional document, the
British North America Act, 12 9 does not explicitly enshrine
fundamental freedoms and rights, but essentially deals with the
distribution of powers between federal and provincial
governments.' 30 Initial judicial attitudes toward constitutional
127. B. Laskin, The Function ofLaw (1973), 11 Alta. L. Rev. 118 at 120.
128. See A. Cox, The New Dimensionsof ConstitutionalAdjudication (1976), 88
Proc. Mass. Hist. Soc. 60; A. Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American
Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976) passim; supra, note 63
and accompanying text.
129. (1867), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) (R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, Document

No. 5)
130. This is not to deny that the courts have available to them and have used
interpretation devices to effect a constitutional protection of civil liberties. See W.
S. Tarnopolsky, The Supreme Court and Civil-Liberties (1976), 14 Alta. L. Rev.
58 at 60-81.
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litigation in Canada were moulded by the reality, until 1949, of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London as the highest
court on constitutional matters.1 3 The Privy Council's conception
of the limits of constitutional adjudication must have been
influenced by the long experience in England with a Parliament
unfettered by written constitutional bounds.. 2 In addition, the
Canadian judiciary's exposure to the notion of limits upon fedem
legislative powers through the CanadianBill of Rights133 has been
limited to a relatively short period (the Bill of Rights was enacted in
1960.) Is it any wonder that, working under these institutional and
historical handicaps, the comparatively inexperienced Canadian
judiciary has not evolved or embraced the kind of active role played
by American courts?
Mr. Justice Laskin secondly points to what might be summarized
as the lack of a legislatively-provided framework within which the
courts can play a broad role

34

: the legislative branch must "provide

131. See generally G. P. Browne, The JudicialCommittee and the British North
America Act, An Analysis of the Interpretative Scheme for the Distribution of
Legislative Powers(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967)
132. The Privy Council did strike down legislation. See, e.g. F. R. Scott, The
Prihy CouncilandMr. Bennett's 'New Deal'Legislation contained in his Essayson
the Constitution, Aspects of CanadianLaw and Politics (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1977). However, they did not, where it might have been
appropriate, preface their decisions with a consideration of the civil rights issues
involved. The Privy Council acted to distribute legislative power on the assumption
that full authority to enact any kind of legislation was within the competence of the
combined federal and provincial powers. See W. S. Tarnopolsky, supra, note 130
at 62-64 and The Canadian Bill of Rights (2nd ed. Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1975), at 29-31
133. Supra, note 84
134. Supra, note 127. Laskin, C. J. C.'s comments are concerned with the role of
courts in forming social policy. He recognizes in addition to a legislative base for
this role, the use of common law methods to evolve appropriate social policy. It
appears that Canadian scholars have similarily focused their attention, perhaps
unduly, upon recognizing and/or advocating a law-making and/or social policy
oriented model of judicial behaviour, as contrasted to the traditional model
involving the application of pre-existing ascertainable law to "the facts". See, e.g.
P. Weiler, Two Models of JudicialDecision-Making(1968), 46 Can. B. Rev. 406;
P. Weiler, Legal Values andJudicialDecision-Making(1970), 48 Can. B. Rev. 1;
B. Laskin, The Role and Functions of FinalAppelate Courts: The Supreme Court
of Canada (1975), 53 Can. B. Rev. 469 at 477-81; R. A. Samek, The Dynamic
Model of the JudicialProcessand the Ratio Decidendi of a Case (1964), 42 Can.
B. Rev. 433 (contrasting a static model based upon closed rules with a model
recognizing rules as open-textured and indeterminate); F. Vaughan, The Canadian
Courts andPublic Polic' Making: The Case of JusticeEmmett M. Hall (1973-74),
38 Sask. L. Rev. 357; J. U. Lewis, supra, note 7 (advocating Llewellyn's "Grand
Style" rather than the prevalent "Formal Style"); P. Russell, Judicial Power in

120 The Dalhousie Law Journal

the fodder upon which judicial action is sustained.' 1 3 5 I have
emphasized the need for broad legislative schemes as a basis for the
operation of Enforcement phenomena. I have also recognized,
outside of constitutional questions themselves, the supremacy of the
legislative branch. Legislatures must act to provide the norms of
public conduct and must allow the courts to play a role in enforcing
the norms by civil process. I have suggested the advent of
legislation providing norms in areas such as human rights,
environmental and consumer protection and competition policy.
What is also significant, is the proclivity of the legislative branch to
rely for enforcement upon a combination of criminal penalties and
administrative agencies. 136 It seems that governmental regulation
and the use by legislatures of specialized tribunals for enforcement
have not been adversely received by the public in Canada. 137
In addition to inexperience stemming from the lack of clear
constitutional and legislative fodder for the judiciary to act upon,
Canada's Political Culture contained in Courts and Trials: A Multidiciplinary
Approach (M. L. Friedland ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975) at 75
135. B. Laskin, id.
136. See, e.g. I. A. Hunter, supra, note 81 and W. S. Tarnopolsky, The Iron
Hand in the Velvet Glove: Administration and Enforcement of Human Rights
Legislation in Canada (1968), 46 Can. B. Rev. 565 (emphasizing the use of
administrative agencies to enforce human rights legislation); M. J. Trebilcork,
Winners and Losers in the Modern Regulatory System: Must the ConsumerAlways
Lose (1975), 13 Osgoode Hall L. J. 619 (recognizing the pervasive influence of
regulatory agencies and the significant impact their decisions have on consumer's
interests); D. P. Emond, Participationand the Environment: A Strategy for
DemocratizingCanada'sEnvironmentalProtectionLaws (1975), 13 Osgoode Hall
L. J. 783 (discussing, inter alia, the fact that most Canadian environmental
protection laws rely for their enforcement upon administrative agencies); I. M.
Christie, The Nature of the Laywer's Role in the Administrative Process (1971),
Lectures L. S. U. C. 1 (who states, at 2: "Administrative decision making, either
by tribunal or administrative official, is the hallmark of... broad schemes of
social legislation") and (1971), Lectures L.S.U.C. generally; S. Wexler,
Non-JudicialDecision-Making (1975), 13 Osgoode Hall L. J. 839 (who states, at
839: "Most of the decisions which affect a person's legal rights and duties are not
made in courts. They are made in other institutions and only the tiniest fraction of
them are either in theory reviewable or in fact reviewed by courts."); J. M.
Hendry, Some Observationson the CanadianRegulatoryAgency (1976), 3 Dal. L.
J. 3 (who states, at 22: "By traditional definition, the legislature makes the law, the
executive (administrative) enforces the law and the judiciary interprets it").
137. J. Willis, AdministrativeLaw in Canada (1961), 39 Can. B. Rev. 251 at 253:
"Administrative law has never raised in Canada the storms of public
controversy that it did in England and the United States. The reason may be that
Canada has never been, is not and never could be a laissez-fairestate; it depends
for its continued national existence on government action and Canadians have
had to accept government regulation as one of the facts of life."
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one can legitimately point to Canadian inexperience resulting from a
smaller population and correspondingly less litigation. The reduced
volume of activity must be a factor in accounting for the meagre
Canadian Enforcement phenomena.
Not only are Canadians accustomed to turning, at least initially,
to administrative officials and tribunals to enforce their rights in
such areas as consumer and environmental protection and human
rights, but they have embraced another institution to intercede when
the grievances are with governmental bureaucracies, namely, the
ombudsman. ' 3 8 This institution, while often functioning where no
legal basis of complaint exists, no doubt also serves to divert
attention away from courts as a possible avenue of redress when a
grievance cognizable by courts of law exists. 13 9 When citizens turn
to an ombudsman rather than the courts to supervise administrative
excesses, the judiciary is deprived of further exposure to a role
enforcing statutorily prescribed conduct.
Consider as well the role of contingency fees and the lawyer as
entrepreneur. 140 Until recently Canadian jurisdictions have generally condemned contingency fees, although signs of a thawing in
attitude are present. 141 Such a system of renumeration is not only
common in the United States, but forms the backbone of the small
claim class action. An individual with a small financial stake in the
outcome of a suit, unless highly motivated, has little incentive to
maintain an action as a representative, and for the benefit, of a large
number of people who make no financial contribution to the
138. See A. E. Maloney, The Function of the Ombudsman's Office (1976), 10
Gazette L.S.U.C. 110, who indicates ombudsmen exist in eight provinces as well
as at the Federal level.
Not only are there such governmentally appointed ombudsmen, but a lawyer
from Quebec, Robert Cooper, is "The Ombudsman" on a popular investigative
television program produced by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
139. See A. E. Maloney, id. at 112, who indicates that while courts no doubt
"play a vital role in the correction of abuses of government ... litgation can still
be expensive, exasperating and also protracted and slow." See also A. B. Weir,
The Legislative Ombudsman (1976), 14 Alta. L. Rev. 256; K. A. Friedmann, The
Alberta Ombudsman (1970), 20 U. Toronto L. J. 48; A. Bexelius, The Swedish
Ombudsman (1967), 17 U. Toronto L. J. 170; G. Sawer, The Ombudsman Comes
to Alberta (1968), 6 Alta. L. Rev. 95; C.-A. Sheppard, An Ombudsman for
Canada (1964), 10 McGill L. J. 291; K. Thorson, What About An Ombudsman
(1963), 28 Sask. L. Rev. 169.
140. See generally B. K. Arlidge, Contingency Fees (1974), 6 Ottawa L. Rev.
374; W. B. Williston, The ContingentFee in Canada(1968), 6 Alta. L. Rev. 184.
141. For example, contingency fees are permitted in Nova Scotia.See Civil
Procedure Rules, R. 63.17 - 63.22.
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proceedings. This is especially so when the suit involves significant
initial outlays for such things as retention of counsel, investigation,
the expense of notice and the posting of security. The financial
incentive really lies with counsel, and if success is met with a
handsome fee, counsel may be willing to assume the risk of failure
and to invest his time and his money to finance the suit. To disallow
this role to counsel is to place a brake upon this form of class action.
Bill C-13, while not going the contingency fee route, at least
restricts liability for costs and spreads the burden by allowing
reasonable solicitor and client costs to be taxed as a first charge
14 2
against the gross damages awarded the class.
The preceding compilation of factors has served to suggest why
the development of Enforcement phenomena in Canada has been
retarded.14 3 What of the future? The amendments to the Combines
InvestigationAct, both actual and proposed, may be helpful both in
their own right and in serving as a legislative model for future
amendments and enactments in other areas. Other signs of a
relaxation of Dispute Settlement requirements have been highlighted herein. Despite such causes for optimism by proponents of an
Enforcement model, it does seem likely that the cumulative weight
of these factors means that further Enforcement activities will be
slow in developing. In the meantime, the American experience can
at least serve to broaden our horizons and stimulate our thinking.
142. Proposed s. 39.18
143. In addition to the lack of an assertive judicial tradition stemming from such
institutional considerations as the foregoing, regard might be had to the
conservative outlook of the Canadian legal profession. It may be that even without
institutional limits, this subjective factor would inhibit the kind of advocacy
required and the judicial receptiveness needed to foster Enforcement phenomena.
This conservatism is often associated with the socio-economic background, and the
standing in the community, of lawyers, as well as the role of law in maintaining the
status quo. But a meaningful Canadian-American comparison is difficult to do on
the basis of such criteria. That a greater Canadian conservatism exists, however, is
made manifest, more objectively, by the lack of a significant public interest
orientation in Canada. Where in this country do we find the kind of "public
interest" advocacy exhibited in the United States by public interest law firms,
public interest research groups, Nader's Raiders, or such organizations as the
Natural Resource Defence Council. See, e.g. A. Cox, supra, note 128 at 64, 67
[Proc. Mass. Hist. Soc.]; N. R. D. C. v. Train (1975), 396 F. Supp. 1386 (D. C.
D. C.);N. R. D. C. v. Costle (1977), 10 E. R. C. 1625 (D. C. Cir). Some such
advocacy does exist, but it is truly insignificant compared to the highly organized,
institutionalized American network of public interest oriented activities. The failure
of the Canadian legal profession to develop such institutions may be a good index
of a general convervatism which seriously undermines Enforcement developments.

